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INTRODUCTION: A BASTARD’S TALE
In 1986, Karla Coleman was born to an unmarried Louisiana couple.1 
Karla’s father, Louis Hebert, also had a two-year-old son, Louis Jr., from
a previous marriage.2 Although both of Karla’s biological parents raised
her, Karla’s parents remained unmarried.3 During his lifetime, Louis never
legally established that he was Karla’s father.4 When Louis died in
December of 2005, he did not leave a will.5 Louisiana law provided that
1. Karla Coleman’s story is loosely derived from the facts of Succession of 
Hebert. In the case, Karla turned 19 a few months before her father died. That
same year, she filed paternity test results with the trial court. Years later, she 
completed the requisite filiation action, attempting to prove her legal relationship
to her father. Due to the delay, Karla’s action was time-barred under both
Louisiana Civil Code articles 209 and 197. See In re Succession of Hebert, 153
So. 3d 1101, 1102–05 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2014); see also LA. CIV. CODE art.
197 (2018); LA. CIV. CODE art. 209(C) (2005).
2. See generally Hebert, 153 So. 3d at 1102–03.
3. See generally id.
4. See generally id.
5. See generally id. In Louisiana, a “succession” is “the transmission of the
estate of the deceased to his successors.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 871 (2018). Louisiana
recognizes two types of succession: “testate” and “intestate.” Id. art. 873. When
the decedent leaves a valid will, the succession is a “testate” succession. Id. art.
874. In the absence of a valid will, or in an “intestate” succession, the decedent’s
346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd  451 10/12/20  7:08 AM




   
  





    
   
 
    
   
 
     
    
    
 
   
     
    
        
         
 
    
   
 
     
       
   
        
   
  
         
   
 
  
      
    
       
  
         
 
       
      
       
2020] COMMENT 1439
Louis Jr. could inherit without first proving that Louis was his father;6 
however, Karla—a child born out of wedlock—faced a difficult path to
receiving her inheritance.7 Louisiana law required that Karla establish her
legal relationship to Louis before she could inherit from him.8 Although in
early 2006, Karla filed paternity test results in court that demonstrated
Louis was her father, she did not timely complete the filiation action 
required to establish a legal relationship with her father before her 19th 
birthday.9 Karla simply turned 19 one year too early.10 
Karla was caught within the web of a law that prevented a child born
out of wedlock from inheriting if she failed to prove a biological
connection to her father before her 19th birthday.11 In 2005, the Louisiana
Legislature revised the law to impose a more reasonable temporal limit on
undisposed property devolves to the decedent’s relatives by blood or adoption, as
well as to the decedent’s spouse. See id. arts. 880, 875.
6. Under Louisiana law, as a child born to Louis and his wife during their
marriage, Louis Jr. was both a legally recognized heir, able to inherit intestate 
from his father, and a forced heir entitled to a portion of his father’s estate as a
first-degree descendent of Louis under 24 years old. See generally Kathryn
Venturatos Lorio, Successions and Donations, in 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE § 10.1, 296–97 (2d ed. 2009); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 cmt. a
(2018); LA. CIV. CODE arts. 185, 1493(A) (2018); see also discussion infra
Section I.A.1–2.
7. Although Karla was also young enough to qualify as a forced heir, she
could not claim her portion of Louis’s estate until she first proved that he was her
father. Likewise, Karla could not inherit via intestacy laws because, as an
unfiliated child, she was not Louis’s heir. See Lorio, supra note 6, § 3.1, at 70– 
71; see also discussion infra Section I.A.1–2. Note that as a child born out of
wedlock before the Louisiana Legislature revised the Civil Code articles on
filiation, Karla was considered “illegitimate.” See LA. CIV. CODE art. 180 (2005);
see also Lucie R. Kantrow, Presumption Junction: Honey, You Weren’t Part of 
the Function—A Louisiana Mother’s New Right to Contest Her Husband’s
Paternity, 67 LA. L. REV. 633, 637 (2007); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 cmt. a
(2018). Louisiana law formerly distinguished between children born out of
wedlock, or “illegitimate children,” and children born to married parents, or
“legitimate children.” The old law limited the rights of children born out of
wedlock, in effect privileging the nuclear family. See Lorio, supra note 6, § 3.1,
at 70–71; Kantrow, supra note 7, at 637–38.
8. Filiation establishes the link required for heirship. LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 197 cmt. a (2018).
9. See generally Hebert, 153 So. 3d at 1103; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 209 
(2005).
10. See generally Hebert, 153 So. 3d at 1102–03; LA. CIV. CODE art. 197 
(2018); LA. CIV. CODE art. 209 (2005).
11. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 209 (2005).
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1440 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
children filing paternity actions; nevertheless, a Louisiana appellate court
refused to apply the new law to Karla.12 The court found that applying the
new law retrospectively would unfairly deprive Louis Jr. of his rights as 
Louis’s lawful heir.13 As a result, Louis Jr. inherited from his father, and
Karla inherited nothing.14 
At first blush, the retroactivity of Louisiana Civil Code article 197
seems an esoteric legal question, but a deeper look into the issue reveals
that it is a matter of profound, practical importance.15 The number of
children born to unwed mothers in the United States has increased
dramatically over the past few decades.16 In 2018, 53.3% of Louisiana’s
children were born out of wedlock.17 Children born out of wedlock thus
compose a substantial portion of Louisiana’s population; consequently,
their inheritance rights are a pressing concern.18 More than 10 years after
the Louisiana Legislature eliminated Louisiana Civil Code article 209,
most Louisiana appellate courts persistently apply the old law to these
cases, preventing children like Karla from inheriting simply because they
failed to establish paternity before their 19th birthdays.19 Until 2016, all
Louisiana appellate courts refused to apply the new article in cases like
12. See Hebert, 153 So. 3d at 1103–04; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 cmt. e
(2018); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 197 (2018); LA. CIV. CODE art. 209 (2005).
13. See Hebert, 153 So. 3d at 1103–04.
14. See id. at 1104–05.
15. See generally Lorio, supra note 6, § 3.1, at 69.
16. Lorio, supra note 6, § 3.1, at 69 (citing NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2007: WITH CHARTBOOK ON TRENDS IN
THE HEALTH OF AMERICANS 143 tbl.10 (2007)). In 1970, only 10.7% of live births
in the United States were to unmarried mothers. By the turn of the 20th century,
the percentage reached 33.2%. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH,
UNITED STATES, 2016: WITH CHARTBOOK ON LONG-TERM TRENDS IN HEALTH 94
tbl. 4 (2016). In 2018, children born to unmarried parents comprised 39.6% of all
births across the nation. JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2018, at 5 (2019).
17. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 5. Louisiana remains among the states 
with the highest percentages of children born out of wedlock. See id.
18. See id. at 6.
19. See, e.g., Meaux v. Guidry, 140 So. 3d 871 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2014);
Hebert, 153 So. 3d 1101; Thomas v. Roberts, 106 So. 3d 557 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
Cir. 2012); In re Succession of Bailey, 82 So. 3d 322 (La Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2011);
In re Succession of Smith, 29 So. 3d 723 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2010); In re 
Succession of James, 994 So. 2d 120 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2008); Jeanmarie v.
Butler, 942 So. 2d 578 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2006); Succession of Faget v. Faget,
938 So. 2d 1003 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006); Succession of McKay, 921 So. 2d
1219 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006).
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2020] COMMENT 1441
Karla’s.20 By 2018, both the Louisiana Second and Third Circuit Courts of
Appeal had changed tack, creating a circuit split.21 Both courts held that
new article 197 applied retroactively to the claim of a child born out of
wedlock when that child turned 19 before the 2005 changes but whose
father died after the 2005 revision.22 
The proper resolution of the circuit split is essential for determining
the inheritance rights of the many children born out of wedlock in
Louisiana, but it also has broader implications.23 The debate over the
proper temporal effect of article 197 provides a crucial opportunity to
clarify and advance Louisiana’s doctrine of retroactivity as a whole, a 
doctrine that is challenging at best and incomprehensible at worst.24 
Resolving the debate would additionally elucidate another Louisiana
temporal doctrine wrought with confusion—peremption.25 To date, 
Louisiana courts have failed to properly situate the temporal effect of
article 197 within the existing doctrines of retroactivity and peremption.26 
The recent decisions on the applicability of article 197 fail to bring clarity
to Louisiana law.27 As this Comment will demonstrate, the newly decided
cases reach a doctrinally improper result, and the opposing decisions reach
an inequitable solution.28 At this point, only the Louisiana Legislature can
bring clarity to Louisiana’s law and provide equity for children born out
of wedlock by amending article 197.29 
20. See, e.g., Succession of Younger, 206 So. 3d 1088 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 
2016); Meaux, 140 So. 3d 871; Hebert, 153 So. 3d 1101; Thomas, 106 So. 3d 557;
Bailey, 82 So. 3d 322; Smith, 29 So. 3d 723; James, 994 So. 2d 120; Jeanmarie, 
942 So. 2d 578; Faget, 938 So. 2d 1003; McKay, 921 So. 2d 1219.
21. See generally Succession of Pelt, 244 So. 3d 476 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
2018); Younger, 206 So. 3d 1088.
22. See generally Pelt, 244 So. 3d 476; Younger, 206 So. 3d 1088.
23. Louisiana’s doctrines of retroactivity and peremption appear in various
legal contexts. Any time that the Louisiana Legislature imposes a time limit on a
right of action and later seeks to change that period, the doctrines are at issue. See, 
e.g., Chance v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 635 So. 2d 177, 178 (La. 1994); Estate of
Dean v. K-Mart Corp., 678 So. 2d 599, 601 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1996); Tran v.
Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 665 So. 2d 507 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1995).
24. See discussion infra Section I.B.
25. Peremption, a doctrine unique to Louisiana law, refers to the time period
imposed on the existence of a legal right. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3458 (2018); see 
also discussion infra Section I.C.1.
26. See discussion infra Part II.
27. See discussion infra Section II.C.
28. See discussion infra Part II.
29. See discussion infra Part III.
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1442 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Part I provides background information on the development of, and
nuances in, Louisiana’s law of filiation, retroactivity, and peremption. Part
II elaborates on the conflicting interpretations and applications of article 
197 in Louisiana’s appellate courts, as well as critiques the courts’
rationales. Part III argues that only the Louisiana Legislature can resolve
the problem because the legislature possesses the sole power to amend
article 197 and retroactively revive perempted filiation claims. Finally, the
Conclusion will situate the proposed changes to the law within the broader
context of Louisiana’s law of retroactivity and peremption.
I. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK: LOUISIANA’S LAWS OF FILIATION,
RETROACTIVITY, AND PEREMPTION
Louisiana Civil Code articles 209 and 197 involve three distinct areas
of Louisiana law, each of which is challenging in its own right: filiation,
retroactivity, and peremption.30 Filiation concerns the legally recognized
relationship between a parent and a child, which, in the context of this
Comment, is crucial for determining whether a child can inherit from her
father.31 Retroactivity and peremption are temporal effects that the 
legislature may impose on a new law.32 Specifically, retroactivity
determines whether a new law applies retrospectively or prospectively.33 
Peremption is a temporal limit that the legislature imposes on a right of
action created in a new law.34 
A. Establishing the Paternal Link for Inheritance
Filiation is significant because legal consequences stem from
establishing a legal connection to a parent.35 Filiation is particularly
relevant with respect to inheritance rights, which depend on the legally
recognized relationships between a decedent–father and his relatives for 
30. See discussion infra Section I.A–C.
31. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 178 (2018).
32. See generally Sally Brown Richardson, Buried by the Sands of Time: The 
Problem with Peremption, 70 LA. L. REV. 1179 (2010); J.-R. Trahan, Time for a
Change: A Call to Reform Louisiana’s Intertemporal Conflicts Law (Law of
Retroactivity of Laws), 59 LA. L. REV. 661 (1999) [hereinafter Trahan, Time].
33. See generally Trahan, Time, supra note 32.
34. See generally Richardson, supra note 32, at 1179.
35. See Kantrow, supra note 7, at 637; see also Helen Scott Johnson,
Louisiana’s Presumption of Paternity: The Bastardized Issue, 40 LA. L. REV.
1024, 1025 (1980).
346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd  455 10/12/20  7:08 AM










    
  
    
  
  
   
 
     
 
           
       
       
           
 
           
 
          
  
    
      
     
  
      
      
       
 
 
       
         
 




the purposes of intestate succession and forced heirship.36 In 2005, the
Louisiana Legislature substantially revised the Civil Code articles on
filiation.37 Article 197 was one byproduct of the change in the law,
replacing former article 209.38 Both articles concern the time limits on a
child’s right to bring a filiation action.39 
1. The Legal Relationship Between Father and Child
Filiation is the legal relationship between a child and her parent—the 
fact or condition of biological parentage.40 Two kinds of filiation exist:
filiation by nature, or filiation “according to the flesh,” and filiation by
law, or “adoptive filiation.”41 Filiation by nature arises by virtue of either
an actual or presumed biological relationship between the parent and
child.42 Filiation by law requires an act and a judgment of adoption.43 
Filiation is important because it is accompanied by rights and
obligations that stem from the legal relationship between a parent and
child.44 Of particular significance is a biological child’s right to inherit
36. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 cmt. a (2018); see also Kantrow, supra
note 7, at 637; Johnson, supra note 35, at 1025.
37. See Lorio, supra note 6, § 3.1, at 70–72.
38. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 197 (2018); LA. CIV. CODE art. 209
(2005).
39. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 197 (2018); LA. CIV. CODE art. 209
(2005).
40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 178 (2018); Kantrow, supra note 7, at 636; see also
Succession of Robinson, 654 So. 2d 682, 684 (La. 1995). Filiation is “the 
[juridical] line that unites a child to his father or to his mother: to his father,
paternal filiation or paternity; to his mother, maternal filiation or maternity.” J.-
R. Trahan, Glossae on the New Law of Filiation, 67 LA. L. REV. 387, 388 n.1
(2007) [hereinafter Trahan, Filiation] (citing GÉRARD CORNU, 195 DROIT CIVIL:
LA FAMILLE 313 (7th ed. 2001)).
41. Trahan, Filiation, supra note 40, at 388 n.1 (citing JEAN CARBONNIER,
DROIT CIVIL: LA FAMILLE: L’ENFANT, LE COUPLE 181–82 (20th ed. 1999)).
42. See id. (citing CORNU, supra note 40, at 313). The cases discussed in this
Comment involve filiation by nature because the unfiliated children sought to
establish that their fathers were their biological relatives. See id.; see also, e.g., In
re Succession of Hebert, 153 So. 3d 1101, 1103 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2014).
43. See Trahan, Filiation, supra note 40, at 388 n.1 (citing 1194 DROIT DE LA
FAMILLE 389 (Jacqueline Rubellin-Devichi dir. 1999)).
44. Id. at 637; see also Johnson, supra note 35, at 1025 (Filiation “establishes
from whom the child derives certain rights and to whom the child owes specific 
obligations.”).
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1444 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
from her father.45 Unless a valid will specifies otherwise, an unfiliated
child, including a child born out of wedlock, cannot inherit without first 
establishing a legal connection to her father.46 
A child born out of wedlock can prove that she has a biological
relationship to her purported father.47 Filiation is established by sufficient
proof of paternity, maternity, or adoption.48 An unfiliated child
demonstrates her genetic connection to her parents through the filiation
action.49 Specifically, a child born out of wedlock must bring a paternity
action, with the requisite proof of paternity, to establish filiation by
nature.50 
Prior to the 2005 revisions to Louisiana’s filiation law, filiation actions 
were only possible in limited circumstances.51 The pre-2005 Louisiana
Civil Code provided that a child born out of wedlock must complete a
filiation action either before her 19th birthday or within one year of her
father’s death, whichever came first.52 Although children born out of
45. See generally LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 cmt. e (2018). This Comment
is generally concerned with natural filiation as it relates to a father and child. By
contrast, natural filiation between a mother and child is more easily established
because “the mother of a child is the woman who gives birth to the child.” Id. art.
184 cmt. a.
46. See id. art. 197 cmt. a; see also Kantrow, supra note 7, at 637; Johnson,
supra note 35, at 1025.
47. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 197 (2018); LA. CIV. CODE art. 205 (2005). By 
contrast, under prior law, a child born out of wedlock could only acquire the right
to inherit if one of the following circumstances were present: (1) her parents
subsequently married and formally or informally acknowledged her; (2) she was 
legitimated by notarial act; or (3) she became filiated by an action proving her
relation to the parent, instituted within one year of the parent’s death or within 19
years of her birth, whichever came first. Lorio, supra note 6, § 3.1, at 71; see also
LA. CIV. CODE arts. 198, 199, 200, 209(C) (2005).
48. LA. CIV. CODE art. 179 (2018). While her purported father is alive, a child
must prove paternity by a preponderance of the evidence. Once he dies, however,
the evidentiary burden increases to require clear and convincing evidence of
paternity. Id. art. 197.
49. Kantrow, supra note 7, at 636–37; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 197.
50. LA. CIV. CODE art. 197; Kantrow, supra note 7, at 636–37. In other
contexts, a presumption of paternity determines natural filiation. See LA. CIV.
CODE arts. 185, 186, 195, 196 (2019). For example, a child born to married parents
is presumed to be the child of those parents. See id. arts. 184, 185; Kantrow, supra 
note 7, at 637–39. A father may also establish his paternity with a special form of
acknowledgment by authentic act or by bringing an avowal action to prove his
paternity. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 190.1, 198.
51. Lorio, supra note 6, § 3.1, at 70–71.
52. Id. § 3.1, at 71; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 209(C) (2005).
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wedlock were not barred from inheriting, the law imposed a strict time
limit on children who sought to bring a filiation action.53 Only after timely
instituting a filiation action could a child born out of wedlock benefit from
the civil effects of filiation, gaining the rights to support, to sue for
wrongful death, and to inherit intestate or as a forced heir.54 Louisiana’s
succession law governs such inheritance rights.55 
2. Forging a Path to Inheritance Through Filiation
For succession purposes, a child’s relation to the decedent is
significant, particularly in the context of intestate succession and forced
heirship.56 Importantly, an unfiliated child’s right to bring a filiation action 
is not a succession right.57 Rather, inheritance rights are an effect of
filiation.58 Once a child establishes filiation, she may gain succession 
rights, which allow her to inherit intestate or as a forced heir.59 
Thus, when a father dies intestate, his estate devolves to his filiated
children, who are his legal heirs.60 Similarly, Louisiana’s forced heirship
laws provide that the decedent’s children—and sometimes
grandchildren—inherit a certain portion of his estate, regardless of
whether he left a valid will.61 If a child has no legal relationship with her
53. Lorio, supra note 6, § 3.1, at 70–71; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 209(C)
(2005).
54. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 cmt. a (2018).
55. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 871 (2018).
56. See Lorio, supra note 6, § 3.1, at 70–71.
57. See generally LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 cmt. a (2018).
58. See generally id.
59. See generally id.; Lorio, supra note 6, § 3.1, at 70–71.
60. In an intestate succession, the decedent lacks a valid will. Consequently,
the decedent’s estate devolves by operation of law to the decedent’s legal relatives
and spouse. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 880, 875 (2018).
61. See Lorio, supra note 6, § 10.1, at 295–96. Louisiana Civil Code article 
1493 provides, in part:
Forced heirs are descendants of the first degree who, at the time of the 
death of the decedent are twenty-three years of age or younger or
descendants of the first degree of any age who, because of mental
incapacity or physical infirmity, are permanently incapable of taking
care of their persons or administering their estates at the time of the death
of the decedent. . . . For purposes of this Article “permanently incapable
of taking care of their persons or administering their estates at the time
of the death of the decedent” shall include descendants who, at the time 
of death of the decedent, have, according to medical documentation, an
346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd  458 10/12/20  7:08 AM




    
  
 
   
    
  
 
     
 
   
  





     
   
   
      
   
  
   
 
     
      
 
   
       
         
   
 
   
   
       





      
  
  
       
  
1446 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
father, she cannot inherit from him as a forced heir because she is not
legally recognized as her father’s descendant.62 Indeed, only filiated
descendants may be forced heirs.63 
Forced heirship is significant to the present circuit split because, in
some cases, the unfiliated children were young enough to qualify as forced
heirs if they had timely completed their paternity actions.64 For example, 
Karla Coleman was young enough to be a forced heir when her father
died.65 If Karla had established that Louis was her biological father before
she turned 19, she would have inherited from him as a forced heir,
regardless of whether he left a will and included her in it.66 Under both old
and new filiation law, Karla could inherit as a forced heir provided that
she had timely asserted her rights.67 Thus, the difference between articles
197 and 209 with respect to forced heirs is merely temporal.68 
inherited, incurable disease or condition that may render them incapable
of caring for their persons or administering their estates in the future.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493 (2018). Forced heirship guarantees a percentage of the
decedent’s estate to designated heirs. The forced portion of the estate—comprised
of each forced heir’s legitime—is “reserved” for the heirs, whether a succession
is testate or intestate. See id. art. 1494; Lorio, supra note 6, § 10.1, at 295–96.
Forced heirs in their own right are the decedent’s children who, at the time of the
decedent’s death, are 23 years old or younger. Forced heirs also include children
of any age with a mental or physical infirmity who, at the time of the decedent’s
death, are permanently incapable of caring for themselves or administering their
own estates. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493(A). In certain circumstances, a forced heir
need only be incapable at some time in the future. See id. art. 1493(E).
Grandchildren may also be forced heirs by representation, due to the age of a
predeceased parent or due to that grandchild’s disability. See id. art. 1493(B)–(C).
62. See Lorio, supra note 6, § 3.1, at 70–71.
63. See generally LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 cmt. a (2018).
64. See, e.g., In re Succession of Hebert, 153 So. 3d 1101, 1102–03 (La. Ct. 
App. 3d Cir. 2014).
65. See generally id.
66. See generally id.
67. See Lorio, supra note 6, § 3.1, at 70–71.
68. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 197 (2018); LA. CIV. CODE art. 209(C)
(2005). In contrast to temporal limitations on filiation actions in the present circuit
split, succession rights are governed by the law in effect at the time of the
decedent’s death: “Testate and intestate succession rights, including the right to
claim as a forced heir, are governed by the law in effect on the date of the
decedent’s death.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 870(B) (2018). Current Louisiana
succession laws, therefore, do not distinguish between the decedent’s children
based on their status as children born out of wedlock for forced heirship purposes.
See generally id.; see also Lorio, supra note 6, § 3.1, at 70–72; LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 197 cmt. a (2018).
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2020] COMMENT 1447
3. A Change in the Law of Filiation: Article 197 Replaces 209
After several constitutional challenges to Louisiana’s law of filiation, 
the Louisiana Legislature began a piecemeal revision of that portion of the
Civil Code, which culminated in the significant 2005 revision.69 As part of
the revision, the Louisiana Legislature repealed former article 209 and
replaced it with a new article—197.70 
The relevant portion of former article 209(C) provided that a child
born out of wedlock must bring her filiation action within one year of the
death of her alleged father or within 19 years of her birth, whichever
occurred first.71 Purportedly, this narrow time limit promoted the policies
of facilitating the timely administration of estates and minimizing
uncertainty in the disposition of property.72 Article 197, by contrast, 
provided that for succession purposes only, a child could bring a filiation
claim within one year of her purported father’s death.73 The new article
69. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 74
(1968); Succession of Clivens, 426 So. 2d 585 (La. 1982); Succession of Brown,
388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980); Succession of Thompson, 367 So. 2d 796 (La. 1979); 
Succession of Robins, 349 So. 2d 276 (La. 1977). The 2005 revision of the Code
eliminated the legal distinction between children born out of wedlock and children
born to married parents. See generally Katherine Shaw Spaht, Who’s Your
Momma, Who Are Your Daddies? Louisiana’s New Law of Filiation, 67 LA. L.
REV. 307, 307 n.1 (2007); Kantrow, supra note 7, at 641.
70. Lorio, supra note 6, § 3.1, at 71–72.
71. Louisiana Civil Code article 209 provided, in part: 
The proceeding required by this article must be brought within one year
of the death of the alleged parent or within nineteen years of the child’s
birth, whichever first occurs. This time limitation shall run against all
persons, including minors and interdicts. If the proceeding is not timely
instituted, the child may not thereafter establish his filiation, except for
the sole purpose of establishing the right to recover damages under
Article 2315. A proceeding for that purpose may be brought within one
year of the death of the alleged parent and may be cumulated with the
action to recover damages. 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 209(C) (2005).
72. See Talley v. Succession of Stuckey, 614 So. 2d 55, 58–59 (La. 1993);
Succession of Grice, 462 So. 2d 131, 135 (La. 1985). Notably, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court found article 209 constitutional because the 19-year peremptive
period was long enough to provide children a reasonable opportunity to institute 
filiation proceedings, and the time period was “substantially related to the state’s
interest,” including the timely disposition of a father’s estate. See Grice, 462 So.
2d at 135–36.
73. Louisiana Civil Code article 197 provides:
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1448 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
removed the time limit imposed on filiation actions for all purposes except
succession.74 Thus, under current law, a child may bring a filiation action
within one year of her purported father’s death regardless of her age.75 
The change in the law presents the question of which law would apply
to cases where an unfiliated child turned 19 while article 209 was in effect
but whose father died after article 197 took effect.76 The issue boils down 
to a question of timing: Does article 197 apply retrospectively to revive
her filiation claim, or did article 209’s time limit bar her filiation claim
forever?77 
B. A Matter of Time: The Complexities of Louisiana’s Law of
Retroactivity
Louisiana’s law of retroactivity is extremely complex and deeply
flawed.78 Intertemporal conflicts of law are a body of legal principles that
govern the resolution of conflicts of law in time, a problem that traverses
various legal fields.79 At times, the Louisiana Legislature explicitly 
signifies the proper temporal application of a law in its enacting
legislation; however, not all legislation provides clear guidance.80 When
ambiguity exists as to whether the legislature intended for a law to apply
retroactively, the presumption is that the law should only apply
prospectively, or forward in time.81 In addition, the legislature passed two 
A child may institute an action to prove paternity even though he is
presumed to be the child of another man. If the action is instituted after
the death of the alleged father, a child shall prove paternity by clear and
convincing evidence.
For purposes of succession only, this action is subject to a peremptive
period of one year. This peremptive period commences to run from the
day of the death of the alleged father.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 197 (2018). The new rule does not distinguish between filiated
and unfiliated children. Spaht, supra note 69, at 322–23.
74. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 197.
75. See id.
76. See, e.g., Succession of Pelt, 244 So. 3d 476 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018);
Succession of Younger, 206 So. 3d 1088 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2016).
77. See, e.g., Pelt, 244 So. 3d 476; Younger, 206 So. 3d 1088.
78. Jackie M. McCreary, Retroactivity of Laws: An Illustration of
Intertemporal Conflicts Law Issues Through the Revised Civil Code Articles on
Disinherison, 62 LA. L. REV. 1321, 1321 (2002).
79. Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 665–66.
80. See id. 681–82.
81. McCreary, supra note 78, at 1324.
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2020] COMMENT 1449
laws governing the retroactive application of laws, but these rules do little
to resolve the inherent complexities of a retroactivity analysis.82 
1. Legislative Origins of Retroactivity
The legal principles governing retroactivity originate in Louisiana
Civil Code article 6 and Louisiana Revised Statutes § 1:2, as well as in the
jurisprudence and doctrine surrounding them.83 According to article 6, the
Louisiana Legislature can impose any temporal effects it desires on a new
piece of legislation.84 Article 6, therefore, requires that courts discern the
legislature’s intent regarding a law’s temporal effects.85 If the legislature’s 
intent is unclear, then courts must classify the law as “procedural,”
“substantive,” or “interpretative.”86 Article 6 authorizes retroactive 
application of laws that the courts deem procedural and interpretative,
absent legislative expression to the contrary and subject to constitutional
protections.87 Substantive legislation only applies prospectively, but the
other two statutory classifications apply both prospectively and
retroactively.88 Louisiana Revised Statutes § 1:2 provides that the
legislature can impose whatever temporal effects it desires on new
legislation, and if the legislature’s intent is unclear, courts cannot apply a
statute retroactively.89 
82. See id.
83. Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 666.
84. Id. at 679.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. P. Raymond Lamonica & Jerry G. Jones, Legislative Law and Procedure, 
in 20 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 6.4, 115–16 (2004). “In the absence of
contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only.
Procedural and interpretative laws apply both prospectively and retroactively,
unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 6
(2018).
88. Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 680; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 6.
89. Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 681–82; see also LA. REV. STAT. § 1:2
(2018) (“No Section of the Revised Statutes is retroactive unless it is expressly so
stated.”). At face value, article 6 and Louisiana Revised Statutes § 1:2 conflict. 
Louisiana courts resolve the apparent conflict by reading article 6 and Louisiana 
Revised Statutes § 1:2 as co-extensive, such that the statutory prohibition on
retroactivity applies only to substantive laws. Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at
684–85; see also Lamonica & Jones, supra note 87, § 6.4, at 115. Professor Trahan
argues that the courts’ interpretation does not resolve the conflict implicit in
article 6 and Louisiana Revised Statutes § 1:2. See Trahan, Time, supra note 32,
at 708–10.
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1450 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Based on these provisions, a Louisiana retroactivity analysis contains
two essential prongs: (1) determine the Louisiana Legislature’s intent; and
(2) classify the law.90 Adding to the confusion, no legislation provides a
definition of retroactivity.91 Courts therefore struggle to determine
whether a new law would apply retroactively in a particular case and
thereby fall within the scrutiny of article 6.92 
2. Louisiana Courts and the Quest to Define Retroactivity
One of the principal flaws with Louisiana’s retroactivity laws is the
absence of a single definition for the concept of retroactivity.93 After the 
legislature failed to provide a definition of retroactivity, Louisiana courts
invented two theories defining retroactivity—the “vested rights” and
“completed acts” theories.94 Both theories of retroactivity are vague and
impracticable.95 The reigning definition among Louisiana courts is the
90. See Lamonica & Jones, supra note 87, § 6.4, at 116.
91. Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 684.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 766.
94. Id. This Comment considers only the “vested rights” definition of
retroactivity because it is modern Louisiana courts’ approach to retroactivity. A
minority of Louisiana courts use a “completed acts” definition of retroactivity,
which can be characterized as a more “intuitive” approach. Under the “completed
acts” definition, the question is not if a right has been acquired, but if an act has
been realized under the old law. Put another way, acts completed while the old
law was in effect are governed by the old law; conversely, acts completed after
the imposition of the new law are governed by the new law. Id. at 694–96. For
example, if the legislature passes a law requiring defendant–insurers to pay a
settlement agreement within 30 days of its execution, and the insurers fail to pay
within 30 days, the new law applies prospectively to the insurers. The insurers’
conduct, exposing them to liability, occurred after the statute became law. Under
the “completed acts” theory, it does not matter that the insurance policy and the
plaintiff’s accident predated the statute. All that matters is that the insurers’ act of
violating the settlement law occurred after the new law’s enactment. See id.; see
also Manuel v. La. Sheriff’s Risk Mgmt. Fund, 664 So. 2d 81 (La. 1995).
95. McCreary, supra note 78, at 1325. By contrast, Paul Roubier’s work on
retroactivity greatly influenced the modern civilian approach to the problem of
retroactivity and reconciled some of the problems inherent in the traditional
approaches. Id. at 1327; see generally PAUL ROUBIER, LE DROIT TRANSITOIRE:
CONFLITS DES LOIS DANS LE TEMPS (2d ed. 1960). Roubier’s system, which has 
been adopted by a few civil law jurisdictions, including France, revolves around
the notion of “juridical situations.” Eva Steiner, Judicial Rulings with Prospective 
Effect—From Comparison to Systematisation, in 3 COMPARING THE PROSPECTIVE
EFFECT OF JUDICIAL RULINGS ACROSS JURISDICTIONS 20 (Eva Steiner ed., 2015).
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2020] COMMENT 1451
vested rights theory of retroactivity, which is the only theory of
retroactivity that courts apply in the present circuit split.96 The essential
function of Louisiana’s vested rights definition of retroactivity is to
determine whether a law will apply retroactively at all—that is, backward
in time—as opposed to prospectively.97 
A secondary issue is that various interpretations of the term “vested 
rights” complicate Louisiana courts’ application of the vested rights theory
of retroactivity.98 As used by Louisiana courts, the term generally consists
of two components: (1) a vested right is a present right; and (2) a vested
right is a property, or patrimonial, right.99 
Vested rights are present rights because they are presently realized and
exercisable.100 Although all vested rights are present rights, all present
rights are not vested.101 A present right is not “vested unless it is ‘absolute, 
A juridical situation is a “complex of rights and duties.” McCreary, supra note
78, at 1325 (citing PAUL ROUBIER, DROITS SUBJECTIFS ET SITUATIONS
JURIDIQUES 52, 53 (1963)). Juridical situations are not completed instantaneously. 
Essentially, Roubier’s theory proposes a tripartite system for classifying the
effects that laws have on juridical situations. Some laws retroactively affect 
juridical situations; some laws have an immediate effect on juridical situations;
and some old laws survive changes to the new law. Most temporal problems arise 
because courts confuse the distinction between the “retroactive” and “immediate”
effects on juridical situations. Steiner, supra note 95, at 20. Roubier posits that
only the retroactive effect of a law is problematic in situations where a juridical
situation resulted in fully extinguished facts, which cannot be affected by new 
law. Roubier’s theory promotes, as a general rule, the immediate effect—that is,
the application of a new law to a present situation—to regulate intertemporal
conflicts of law. Id.; see generally ROUBIER, supra note 95. No Louisiana court
has adopted Roubier’s approach. See McCreary, supra note 78, at 1327.
96. See generally Trahan, Time, supra note 32.
97. See id. at 688–89 n.74. Louisiana’s vested rights theory of retroactivity
closely parallels the once dominant civilian “theory of acquired rights.” Id. at 688. 
Likewise, the function of the civil law theory of acquired rights was to determine
whether a new law would apply retroactively or prospectively. See id. at 688–89 
n.74.
98. See Rebecca Barrett Hall, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Dressing-up 
Substantive Legislation to Trigger the Interpretive Exception to Retroactivity 
Violates Constitutional Principles, 67 LA. L. REV. 599, 616 (2007); see also
Michael A. Cancienne, Smith v. LASERS: The Louisiana Supreme Court Adjusts
a Legislative Miscalculation, 65 LA. L. REV. 881, 898–901 (2005) (discussing the
faulty application of vested rights).
99. Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 690.
100. See generally Hall, supra note 98, at 617.
101. Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 690–91.
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1452 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
complete and unconditional, independent of a contingency.’”102 Vested
rights are therefore theoretically distinguishable from “expectant rights,”
which are rights that are not yet realized nor exercisable.103 Subsequent
legislation may retroactively destroy expectant rights, but it may not
abridge vested rights.104 For example, in a torts context, if John hits Mary
in the back of the head, Mary’s right to sue John does not vest until John
injures her.105 Once John hits Mary in the back of the head, she has a
present right—the vested right to sue John for the tort of battery.106 By 
contrast, a different scenario illustrates expectant rights.107 Again, John
hits Mary in the back of the head, but this time Mary employs Ginger as 
her attorney in her suit against John.108 Mary and Ginger enter a 
contingency fee agreement, wherein Ginger’s pay is contingent upon
Mary’s successful recovery against John. Ginger’s right to a portion of
Mary’s recovery is an expectant right because it is contingent on the mere
expectancy of a future benefit.109 
More specifically, a vested right is a property right, or under civilian
nomenclature, a “patrimonial” right.110 Patrimonial rights are “susceptible
of pecuniary evaluation.”111 For example, Mary’s right in her tort suit
against John is patrimonial in nature because her suit has a monetary
value.112 Similarly, patrimonial juridical acts113 create, modify, or
102. Id. at 691 (quoting Tennant v. Russell, 39 So. 2d 726, 728 (La. 1949)).
103. See Hall, supra note 98, at 617.
104. Id.
105. See generally id.
106. See generally id.
107. See generally Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 690; see also Tennant v.
Russell, 39 So. 2d 726, 728 (La. 1949).
108. See generally Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 690; see also Tennant, 39 
So. 2d at 728.
109. See generally Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 690; see also Tennant, 39 
So. 2d at 728.
110. Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 690; see also SAÚL LITVINOFF & THOMAS
TÊTE, LOUISIANA LEGAL TRANSACTIONS: THE CIVIL LAW OF JURIDICAL ACTS 140
(1969). Louisiana courts often use the terms “patrimonial right” and “property
right” interchangeably. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE § 1:3, 4 (4th ed. 2001) (noting that courts use the word property
“broadly to denote rights forming part of a person’s patrimony, and narrowly to
denote rights conferring on a person a direct and immediate authority for the use 
and enjoyment of a thing that is susceptible of appropriation.”).
111. Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 690.
112. See generally id.
113. In the civil law tradition, legal relationships may be formed by the wills
of the parties and are given effect by law. These relationships are referred to under
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2020] COMMENT 1453
extinguish rights with a pecuniary value.114 For example, when parties
contract to sell a piece of land, the contract is an example of a patrimonial
juridical act.115 An extra-patrimonial juridical act, conversely, involves
rights that are not subject to pecuniary evaluation.116 Extra-patrimonial
juridical acts concern family and personal rights, such as adoption and
marriage.117 
A third key and vexing feature of Louisiana’s retroactivity analysis is
that the notion of vested rights arises numerous times within the analytical 
chain.118 In fact, the notion of vested rights appears in three distinct stages
of the retroactivity analysis: (1) in determining whether a retroactive
application of a law is necessary; (2) in evaluating whether a law is
substantive; and (3) in deciding whether a proposed application of a
statute, already found to have a retroactive application, is constitutionally
permissible.119 The definition of vested rights retains the same general
meaning in all contexts, although the term principally developed in the
constitutional law context.120 Louisiana’s law of retroactivity thus presents
an intriguing blend of old civil law retroactivity doctrine and American
jurisprudence that contemplates constitutional due process issues posed by
the retroactive effect of laws.121 
Putting these pieces together, the vested rights theory defines a
retroactive law as one that “takes away or impairs vested rights acquired
under existing laws or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or
attaches a new disability with respect to transactions or considerations
already passed.”122 A vested rights approach to retroactivity begins with
two considerations: (1) whether the proposed application of a new statute
Louisiana law as “juridical acts.” Conversely, “juridical facts” are legal
relationships that are imposed without regard to the wills of the parties. For
example, the civil obligation to repair the harm done to another person through a
tort is a juridical fact imposed on the tortfeasor by law. By contrast, a contractual
agreement is formed by the wills of the parties involved and legally recognized
after the fact. A contract is, therefore, a juridical act. LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra
note 110, at v–vi. Juridical acts may be further classified by the legal fiction that 





118. See Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 688–89 n.74–75.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 689 n.76; discussion infra Section I.B.3.
121. See id. at 688–89 n.74–75.
122. Id. at 687 (quoting Brown v. Indem. Ins. Co., 108 So. 2d 812 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1959)).
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1454 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
is retroactive or prospective, which depends on how it affects “existing 
rights and obligations”; and (2) if the application of the new law alters any
“rights and obligations,” the law is retroactive.123 Simply put, if a statute
deprives someone of a vested right, then the application is retroactive.124 
If the statute does not deprive someone of a vested right, then the
application is prospective.125 
The vested rights analysis also considers the time at which a party
acquires the right to assert a cause of action.126 When the party acquires
the right to assert a cause of action, that right is a “vested” property right
imbued with due process protections.127 In Louisiana, the moment a party
can sue to protect her right, the cause of action accrues and the right is 
“vested.”128 For example, once John hits Mary in the back of the head, 
Mary’s vested right to sue John in a tort action arises immediately upon
her injury.129 If the legislature subsequently changed the law to provide
that only men can sue for tort actions before Mary sued John, the new law
would prevent Mary from bringing her claim, thereby affecting her vested
right.130 The new law, therefore, invokes a retroactive application.131 
The determination of whether article 197 divests a vested right is
therefore essential to resolving the circuit split.132 The threshold
determination under a Louisiana retroactivity analysis is whether
retroactive application of a new law occurs at all.133 Courts must consider
whether a change in the law of filiation affects anyone’s vested rights and,
thus, whether article 197 calls for a retroactive application at all.134 The 
retroactivity analysis includes a determination of which rights are at issue
and whether the right to bring a filiation action constitutes a vested and
patrimonial right or simply an extra-patrimonial right, which does not have
retroactive implications.135 The preliminary vested rights consideration
123. Id. at 693.
124. See id. at 689.
125. Id.
126. Hall, supra note 98, at 617.
127. Id. (citing Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., 783 So. 2d 1251, 1259 (La.
2001)).
128. Id.
129. See generally id.
130. See generally id.
131. See generally id.
132. See discussion infra Section III.B.
133. See generally Trahan, Time, supra note 32.
134. See generally id.
135. See generally id.
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2020] COMMENT 1455
constitutes the first layer of a Louisiana retroactivity analysis.136 A court’s 
subsequent mission in a Louisiana retroactivity analysis is to search for
and give effect to the Louisiana Legislature’s intent.137 
3. Louisiana’s Vested Rights Retroactivity Analysis: Discerning 
Legislative Intent and the Classification Schema
Once the threshold vested rights analysis occurs, Louisiana courts may
proceed to the second part of the retroactivity analysis, which consists of
a two-part analysis under article 6.138 If a law would apply retroactively
under the vested rights definition, then courts generally should give
deference to the legislature’s intent in applying the law.139 Pursuant to 
Louisiana’s civil law influences, Louisiana courts do not engage in
statutory interpretation unless the courts first justify that an interpretation
is necessary to clarify ambiguity in the law.140 The article 6 retroactivity 
analysis, therefore, hinges on the Louisiana Legislature’s intent for a law
to apply retroactively or prospectively.141 
The Louisiana Supreme Court interprets article 6 as imposing a two-
fold analysis to determine whether to apply a law retroactively.142 First, a
court should ascertain whether the enacted legislation expresses the
legislature’s intention for the new law to apply prospectively or
retroactively.143 Second, if the court finds legislative intent, the court’s
inquiry ends, unless the enactment impairs contractual obligations or
vested rights.144 If, however, a court fails to find the legislature’s intent, or
if the legislature’s intent is unclear, the court’s interpretation continues.145 




140. See id.; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 9 (2018) (“When a law is clear and
unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law
shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of
the intent of the legislature.”); id. arts. 10–13.
141. Lamonica & Jones, supra note 87, § 6.4, at 116.
142. See generally Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1992); see also
Lamonica & Jones, supra note 87, § 6.4, at 116 (citing Keith v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.
Co., 694 So. 2d 180 (La. 1997)).
143. See Cole, 599 So. 2d at 1063–64; Lamonica & Jones, supra note 87, § 
6.4, at 116.
144. See Cole, 599 So. 2d at 1063–64; Lamonica & Jones, supra note 87, § 
6.4, at 116.
145. See Cole, 599 So. 2d at 1063–64; Lamonica & Jones, supra note 87, § 
6.4, at 120.
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1456 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
When the legislature’s intent is unclear, the enactment must be
classified as procedural, interpretative, or substantive.146 A procedural law
describes the “method of enforcing, processing, administering, or
determining rights, liabilities, or status.”147 Interpretative legislation 
“establish[es] the meaning of prior law, rather than creat[ing] new
rules.”148 Again, although substantive legislation only applies
prospectively, interpretative and procedural legislation apply both
retroactively and prospectively.149 
Vested rights appear again in the classification scheme, playing a role
in defining substantive laws.150 Courts use the vested rights analysis not
only to determine if a law is retroactive, but also to determine if a law is
substantive.151 A substantive law “creates, confers, modifies, or destroys
rights, causes of action, or legal duties.”152 Put another way, substantive
legislation establishes vested rights because substantive legislation
establishes new rights.153 As a result, laws that create new vested rights
should only apply prospectively.154 
The third and final layer of a Louisiana retroactivity analysis involves
determining whether a law clearly designated as retroactive or classified
as a type of law that applies retroactively violates constitutional due
process principles.155 Sometimes, the Louisiana Legislature designates a 
law as retroactive, which means that courts must apply it retroactively, 
unless doing so contravenes constitutional provisions.156 When this occurs,
courts apply the vested rights test a third time to determine if the
legislature’s change to the law impermissibly alters a right such that it
would infringe upon constitutional due process principles.157 If the court
146. See Cole, 599 So. 2d at 1063–64; Lamonica & Jones, supra note 87, § 
6.4, at 120. Professor Trahan argues that these categorical distinctions leave much
to be desired because Louisiana courts have failed to clearly and consistently
delineate the boundaries between them. Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 756–63.
147. Lamonica & Jones, supra note 87, § 6.4, at 121; see also Prejean v. Dixie 
Lloyds Ins. Co., 655 So. 2d 303, 308 (La. 1995).




152. Id. at 120; see also Keith v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 694 So. 2d 180 (La.
1997); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809 (La. 1992).
153. Hall, supra note 98, at 616 (citing Anderson v. Avondale Indus., 798 So.
2d 93, 97 (La. 2001)).
154. See id.; McCreary, supra note 78, at 1325.
155. See Hall, supra note 98, at 617.
156. See id.
157. Id.
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2020] COMMENT 1457
finds that the law attempts to alter a vested right, then the court considers
retroactive application an “impermissibl[e] alter[ation].”158 Courts
interpret changes to substantive law as violations of constitutional due
process because the retroactive application of a law that alters an existing
right attaches consequences to behavior without sufficient notice.159 
An illustration of the entire Louisiana retroactivity analysis is useful
for demonstrating the principles previously discussed.160 Using the prior
example, suppose that John hits Mary in the back of the head, but before
Mary can bring her tort suit, the legislature changes the law to provide that
only men can sue in tort actions.161 The first layer of Louisiana’s
retroactivity analysis is therefore satisfied because the new law invokes a
retroactive application.162 Again, the new law prevents Mary from
bringing her claim and thus affects her vested right to sue John.163 The
second step is to determine the legislature’s intent under the two-part
article 6 analysis.164 A court would first look at the statute to determine if
the legislature expressly provided for the law to apply retroactively.165 For
example, if the legislature clearly stated that the new law “applied both
retroactively and prospectively to all tort claims,” a court would likely find 
that the first prong of the article 6 analysis was satisfied because the
legislature’s intent with respect to the temporal application of the law is
“clear and unequivocal.”166 Reaching the second prong of the article 6
analysis would be unnecessary.167 At that point, the court would move on 
to the third step of the retroactivity analysis to determine if the new law
violated Mary’s due process rights.168 Here, because her vested right to sue 
was impaired by the new law, it is likely the court would find that applying
the new law retroactively would violate Mary’s constitutional rights.169 
Therefore, the court would be unwilling to apply the law retroactively.170 
158. Id. at 616.
159. Id. at 617–18.
160. See discussion supra Section I.B.
161. See generally Hall, supra note 98, at 617.
162. See generally id.
163. See generally id.
164. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 6 (2018); Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So.
2d 1058 (La. 1992).
165. See generally Cole, 599 So. 2d 1058.
166. See, e.g., Chance v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 635 So. 2d 177, 178 (La.
1994).
167. See generally id; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 6.
168. See generally Hall, supra note 98, at 617.
169. See generally id.
170. See generally id.
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1458 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
By contrast, suppose the legislature did not clearly state that the new
law should be applied retroactively.171 If that were the case, then the court
would find the legislature’s intent unclear during the first part of the article
6 analysis.172 Then, the court would proceed to classify the new law as
procedural, interpretative, or substantive.173 Here, the court would most
likely classify the law as substantive because, as explained prior, it is likely
that the court would find that the law affected Mary’s vested right to sue
in tort—modifying or destroying her right to sue.174 The general rule is 
that such substantive legislation does not apply retroactively.175 
Consequently, the court would likely find that the law should not apply
retroactively.176 Reaching the third layer of the analysis would be
unnecessary in this scenario.177 Yet if the court instead classified the new
law as merely interpretative, the court would then have to reach the
constitutional due process step because even though an interpretative law
may apply retroactively, the court should not apply it retroactively if it
would divest Mary of her constitutional rights.178 
As vested rights appear in three prongs of the retroactivity analysis— 
determining whether a retroactive application of a law is necessary,
evaluating whether a law is substantive, and deciding whether a proposed
retroactive application of a statute is constitutionally permissible—the 
retroactivity analysis seems illogical and potentially nonsensical.179 The
circular reasoning of Louisiana’s vested rights retroactivity analysis leads
to the incoherent conclusion that no law affecting a vested right can ever
apply retroactively.180 This logic conflicts with the text of article 6, which
171. See generally Cole, 599 So. 2d 1058; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 6.
172. See generally Cole, 599 So. 2d 1058.
173. See generally id.; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 6.
174. See generally Lamonica & Jones, supra note 87, § 6.4, at 120–21.
175. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 6.
176. See generally Hall, supra note 98, at 617.
177. See generally id.
178. See generally id. at 617–18.
179. See generally id.
180. See generally id. In theory, only laws that affect vested rights will satisfy
the initial vested rights retroactivity inquiry. If a law does not affect a vested right,
then applying it should not invoke a retroactive application of law. A court would
never need to reach the two-part article 6 analysis. However, if a law affects a 
vested right at the threshold level, it would also affect vested rights at either the
article 6 or the constitutional due process levels of the retroactivity analysis. Thus,
any law affecting a vested right will likely never apply retroactively. Moreover,
according to the vested rights definition of retroactivity, a law that does not affect 
vested rights does not invoke a retroactivity analysis at all. See discussion supra
Section I.B.
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2020] COMMENT 1459
recognizes the possibility that such laws may apply retroactively.181 
Although confusing and illogical, one aspect of Louisiana’s retroactivity
analysis is clear: If vested rights are not at stake, courts should have no
issue applying a law retroactively.182 Nevertheless, resolving the problem
that article 197 and now-repealed article 209 pose does not end with a
retroactivity analysis because both articles involve a second temporal
issue—peremptive periods.183 
C. Extinguished Rights: Louisiana’s Doctrine of Peremption
Articles 197 and 209 both include temporal limitations on filiation
actions.184 When the Louisiana Legislature imposes a time limit on a 
party’s right to bring an action, the retroactivity analysis implicates further
complexities because the analysis includes a second level of time
limitations.185 Specifically, once a claim expires under an old law, courts 
must consider whether a new law can revive that claim or otherwise extend
the old law’s time limit.186 Thus, a fundamental question in resolving the 
circuit split is whether article 197 can revive a child’s filiation claim that
expired under article 209.187 
1. Separating Prescription from Peremption 
Peremption is a time period that the legislature imposes on the
existence of a right.188 Unless a litigant timely exercises her right, the
passage of a peremptive period extinguishes the right.189 Peremption is
rooted in the doctrine of liberative prescription, which was originally
introduced under Roman law as an equitable means of temporally limiting
181. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 6 (2018).
182. See generally Hall, supra note 98, at 617–18. Of course, pursuant to a
vested rights definition of retroactivity, a law that does not affect a vested right
does not invoke a retroactivity analysis in the first place. Perhaps this problematic
definition is the reason Louisiana courts so often skip over the threshold inquiry
in their retroactivity analyses. See Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 684.
183. See generally id.
184. See generally id.
185. See generally id.
186. See generally id.
187. See generally id.
188. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3458 (2018).
189. See id.
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1460 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
recently created actions.190 The Louisiana Legislature did not add 
peremption to the Louisiana Civil Code until the 1982 revision.191 
Prior to the inclusion of peremption in the Civil Code, Louisiana
courts drew from the French doctrine of “forfeiture” to create what
Louisiana courts referred to as “peremption.”192 French prescriptive 
periods promoted equity for debtors by limiting the time in which creditors
could assert claims against them, although creditors could assert some
defenses to prescription.193 By contrast, the notion of forfeiture promoted
the policy of protecting debtors from all prescription-related safeguards
for the creditor, effectively weighing the policy of protecting debtors over
the creditor’s right to collect a debt.194 Under French law, forfeitures were
beyond the reach of the rules governing prescription, such as interruption
and suspension of the time limitation imposed.195 Instead, the expiration 
of the time period forever ended a creditor’s right to assert a claim against
a debtor.196 Regardless of the reason for the delay, the creditor forfeited 
her right to sue if she did not timely file her claim.197 
The operation of peremption under Louisiana law is quite similar.198 
In Louisiana, prescription requires that a party acquiring a right assert that
190. Richardson, supra note 32, at 1182–83. Liberative prescription is the civil
law equivalent of common law statutes of limitations; essentially, a liberative
prescriptive period bars untimely claims from litigation. Rachel L. Kovach, Sorry
Daddy—Your Time Is Up: Rebutting the Presumption of Paternity in Louisiana, 
56 LOY. L. REV. 651, 661 (2010).
191. Marjorie Nieset Neufeld, Prescription and Peremption—The 1982
Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code, 58 TUL. L. REV. 593, 601 (1983).
192. Richardson, supra note 32, at 1184. Although Louisiana courts drew
peremption from French law and the concept of forfeiture, French law does not
have a precisely equivalent doctrine. Louisiana’s doctrine of peremption
apparently mutated from its original source due to common law influences.
Benjamin West Janke & François-Xavier Licari, The French Revision of
Prescription: A Model for Louisiana?, 85 TUL. L. REV. 2, 23–24 (2010).
193. Richardson, supra note 32, at 1183.
194. Id. at 1183–84.
195. Id. at 1184. Peremptive periods are not subject to renunciation,
interruption, or suspension. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3461 (2018). Renunciation is
an ex-post alteration of a creditor’s ability to file suit (allowing a debtor to
renounce a right to bar the creditor’s suit after the creditor’s time period has run),
whereas suspension (pausing the time period) and interruption (stopping the time
period and restarting it when the interruption ends) are ex-ante alterations.
Richardson, supra note 32, at 1189–90.
196. Richardson, supra note 32, at 1184.
197. Id.
198. See id.
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right by filing the claim before the prescriptive period completely runs,
barring any suit after accrual of the period.199 By contrast, the expiration 
of a peremptive period extinguishes the right, and the parties’ actions have 
no effect on extending the running of the time period.200 In other words, a 
prescriptive period bars the remedy, but a peremptive period destroys the
right.201 As no right exists after the peremptive period lapses, litigation 
cannot proceed beyond the established period.202 No doctrine can alter
peremptive periods.203 
Peremption was originally a court-created doctrine, and, as such,
Louisiana courts traditionally bore the burden of identifying whether the
legislature intended for a time period to have the effects of peremption or
prescription.204 Courts have nevertheless struggled to distinguish between 
the two doctrines since peremption’s inception.205 Likewise, in the circuit
split at issue, the courts frequently confounded peremptive and
prescriptive periods, which vitally prevented some courts from
199. Neufeld, supra note 191, at 602.
200. Id.
201. Jeffrey J. Gelpi, Has Prescription Preempted Peremption?: A Plea to
Bury the Ghosts of Survival Actions, 89 TUL. L. REV. 253, 259 (2014).
202. Richardson, supra note 32, at 1188. For this reason, a perempted claim
cannot serve as a natural obligation. See id. at 1191–92. Further, because
peremption destroys the underlying right, a party who files suit after the period
elapses has no cause of action because she has no right, which is why courts may
raise the exception of peremption sua sponte. See id. at 1193.
203. See id. at 1189.
204. Gelpi, supra note 201, at 260. The Civil Code does not provide guidance
for determining whether a particular time period is prescriptive or peremptive in
the absence of express legislative intent; when this occurs, the interpretive task is
left to the courts. See id.
205. Richardson, supra note 32, at 1204. Originally, Louisiana courts followed
the Guillory test. Id. at 1206. The focus of the test was whether the Louisiana
Legislature, in one statute, created a previously nonexistent cause of action
coupled closely with a time limit. See Guillory v. Avoyelles Ry. Co., 28 So. 899,
901 (La. 1900). The Guillory test developed over time to focus on the text and
purpose of the statute as well. Richardson, supra note 32, at 1206–07. The modern 
test consists of two parts: (1) whether the Louisiana Legislature clearly worded
the statute such that there is no doubt as to its intent to create a peremptive or
prescriptive period; and (2) when additional interpretation is necessary, courts
must look to the purpose of the statute. Id. at 1207. Some courts and scholars tried
to make bright-line rules to facilitate consistent application of the test. Neither the
test itself nor the attempts at establishing bright-line rules have resolved the
difficulties courts face in determining whether a statute imposes a peremptive or
prescriptive period in the absence of clear legislative intent. Id. at 1207–08.
346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd  474 10/12/20  7:08 AM








   
  
  
   







     
    
    
  
     
    
   
   
 
 
     
      
     
        
  
         
     
     
     
     
      
1462 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
interpreting articles 197 and 209 in a doctrinally correct manner.206 
Although the legislature did not expressly provide that article 209 imposed
a peremptive period, Louisiana courts and scholars interpreted it as 
peremptive in nature.207 Likewise, under the plain language of article 197,
the temporal period is peremptive.208 Nevertheless, in the present circuit 
split, the courts failed to distinguish between the doctrines of peremption
and prescription and, consequently, failed to properly apply the doctrines
governing the retroactive revival of extinguished claims.209 As a result, the
courts often relied on jurisprudence concerning the interaction of
retroactivity and prescriptive periods, including the seminal Louisiana
Supreme Court decision in Chance v. American Honda Motor Co.210 
2. Chance v. American Honda Motor Co.: Retroactivity and 
Prescription Collide
Although problematic in its own right, Chance v. American Honda
Motor Co. highlights another glaring question within Louisiana’s vested
rights retroactivity analysis: Can the Louisiana Legislature alter
prescriptive or peremptive periods by reviving previously time-barred 
claims?211 In Chance, the Louisiana Supreme Court encountered the
specific issue of whether a new prescriptive statute, which extended a
previous prescriptive period, applied retroactively to revive a then-
prescribed cause of action.212 If the court found that the legislature was
unable to change a prescriptive or peremptive period through the
enactment of a new law because doing so violated a vested right, then any
time the legislature imposes a new time period in a new law, the legislature
also restricts its own future power to change that law.213 On the other hand,
if the court found that the legislature could extend a prescriptive period,
then the law could unfairly deprive some litigants of the defense that they
206. See generally Trahan, Time, supra note 32.
207. See, e.g., Talley v. Succession of Stuckey, 614 So. 2d 55, 58 (La. 1993);
see also Trahan, Filiation, supra note 40, at 443.
208. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 197 (2018) (“For purposes of succession only, this
action is subject to a peremptive period of one year.”) (emphasis added).
209. See generally Richardson, supra note 32; see also discussion infra Part II.
210. See generally Chance v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 635 So. 2d 177 (La.
1994); see also discussion infra Part II.
211. See generally Lamonica & Jones, supra note 87, § 6.4, at 124 n.62.
212. Chance, 635 So. 2d at 178.
213. See Lamonica & Jones, supra note 87, § 6.4, at 124 n.62.
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2020] COMMENT 1463
were protected from suit by the passage of time.214 The court therefore 
found itself in an uncomfortable position, in which the issue of
retroactivity ultimately hinged upon how the court chose to classify the
new law—as procedural or substantive.215 
As the Chance decision demonstrates, Louisiana courts often have
difficulty drawing a line between the categories of procedural and
substantive laws, or they intentionally obfuscate the line to obtain a
particular result.216 In the context of prescriptive and peremptive periods,
once a cause of action accrues, Louisiana courts consider the cause of
action a vested property right that cannot be “constitutionally divested.”217 
As a general rule, Louisiana courts deem laws affecting prescriptive or
peremptive periods to be procedural laws.218 Courts, therefore, should give
retroactive effect to laws affecting peremptive or prescriptive periods,
except when doing so would impermissibly disturb preexisting vested
rights.219 
Although the Chance court observed that prescriptive statutes
generally are procedural in nature, the court refused to apply the new
statute retroactively because it could revive a prescribed claim.220 That is,
the court found that a retroactive application would impermissibly disturb
a vested right.221 Interestingly, the court determined that the right to plead
the peremptory exception of prescription as a defense in a lawsuit was a
vested right.222 The plurality of the Chance court reclassified the new law 
214. See generally Chance, 635 So. 2d 177; see also Lamonica & Jones, supra
note 87, § 6.4, at 124 n.62 (citing Cameron Par. Sch. Bd. v. Acands, Inc., 687 So.
2d 84 (La. 1997)).
215. See Chance, 635 So. 2d at 178.
216. Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 757.
217. For example, the Louisiana Supreme Court indicated that a cause of
action accrues when a party has the right to sue. Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So.
2d 1058, 1063–64 n.15 (La. 1992). In addition, the Louisiana Supreme Court
applied the same reasoning to defenses against causes of action. See Falgoust v.
Dealers Truck Equip. Co., 748 So. 2d 399 (La. 1999); see also Lamonica & Jones,
supra note 87, § 6.4, at 124 (citing Cole, 599 So. 2d at 1063–64).
218. See Lamonica & Jones, supra note 87, § 6.4, at 124–25.
219. See id. (citing Falgoust, 748 So. 2d 399). Finding that the right to plead
the exception of prescription or peremption is a vested right may effectively limit 
the Louisiana Legislature’s power to revive a cause of action that has already
prescribed. See id. at 124 n.62 (citing Cameron Par. Sch. Bd. v. Acands, Inc., 687
So. 2d 84 (La. 1997)); Chance, 635 So. 2d at 177; Louisiana Health Serv. &
Indem. Co. v. McNamara, 561 So. 2d 712, 718 (La. 1990).
220. Chance, 635 So. 2d at 178.
221. See id.
222. Id.
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1464 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
as substantive because “the defendant acquires the right to plead the 
exception of prescription,” and “a change in that right constitutes a
substantive change in the law as applied to the defendant.”223 According
to the Chance plurality justices, when the Louisiana Legislature extends a
prescriptive period, the change is substantive, and the new law should not
apply retroactively absent a legislative expression.224 Yet favoring the
defendant’s supposed right to plead the exception of prescription must
result in the divestment of the plaintiff’s right to assert a cause of action.225 
Implicit in the plurality opinion is the notion that the classification of a law
as procedural or substantive is relative to the parties—what is procedural
to the plaintiffs may be substantive to the defendants in the same case.226 
The concurring justices agreed that the law should not apply
retroactively but disagreed with the plurality’s rationale, instead invoking
the vested rights approach.227 These justices also argued that the new
legislation certainly was procedural in nature but provided an exception to 
the general rule governing procedural legislation.228 Lastly, the
concurrence found that because the right to plead the exception of
prescription is a vested right, an otherwise procedural piece of legislation
should not apply retroactively to divest that vested right.229 The distinction
between the plurality and the concurring opinions was that the concurring
justices proceeded through the two-step article 6 portion of the
retroactivity analysis before reaching the constitutional vested rights
analysis.230 The plurality opinion stopped at the second step of the article
6 analysis.231 The result was effectively the same because vested rights 
appear at both the second step of the article 6 retroactivity analysis and at
the due process constitutionality analysis.232 
The Chance plurality decision creates further problems in a
retroactivity analysis overlaid with peremption or prescription issues
223. Id.
224. See id.; see also Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 680; see also LA. CIV.
CODE art. 6 (2018).
225. See discussion supra Section I.B.2–3.
226. See Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 759 n.293.
227. Chance, 635 So. 2d at 180 (Hall, J., concurring).
228. Id.
229. Id. Professor Trahan observes that the plurality’s attempt to reclassify the 
legislation as substantive was the greater blunder. Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at
759 n.293.
230. See Chance, 635 So. 2d at 180 (Hall, J., concurring); see discussion supra
Section I.B.3.
231. See Chance, 635 So. 2d at 178; see discussion supra Section I.B.3.
232. See discussion supra Section I.B.3.
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because the decision implies that the Louisiana Legislature cannot change
prior law to have a more liberalizing effect unless the new law expressly
provides for a retroactive application.233 Both the plurality and the
concurrence rely upon the notion that a defendant’s right to plead the
exception of prescription is a vested right.234 If Louisiana courts subscribe
to the idea that both the rights to assert a cause of action and to defend 
against that cause of action are vested rights, then, necessarily, no
Louisiana court will ever find that a new law affecting prescriptive or
peremptive periods applies retroactively in cases subject to pecuniary
evaluation.235 As such, Louisiana courts have continually failed to address
the question of whether the legislature can revive time-barred claims
because prior jurisprudence provides an impetus to reach a premature
conclusion.236 Chance and its jurisprudential ilk, however, are only one
more piece of the picture.237 Civil law and American constitutional law
doctrines provide more cogent answers to the question of whether courts
or a state legislature may revive a perempted filiation claim.238 
3. Causae Finitae: The Civilian Approach to Extinguished Claims 
Except for the two courts in the circuit split at hand, no Louisiana
courts to date have explicitly revived a perempted claim.239 Most 
233. See generally Trahan, Time, supra note 32.
234. See generally Chance, 635 So. 2d at 177. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s
finding that the right to plead the exception of prescription or peremption is a
vested right theoretically limits the Louisiana Legislature’s power to revive a
cause of action that is already prescribed or perempted, a problem outside of the
scope of this Comment. See Lamonica & Jones, supra note 87, § 6.4, at 124 n.62
(citing Cameron Par. Sch. Bd. v. Acands, Inc., 687 So. 2d 84 (La. 1997)).
235. See discussion supra Section I.B.2–3.
236. See discussion supra Section I.B.2–3.
237. See generally Chance, 635 So. 2d at 177.
238. See generally Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945);
see also ROUBIER, supra note 95, at 32.
239. See generally Succession of Pelt, 244 So. 3d 476 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
2018); Succession of Younger, 206 So. 3d 1088 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2016); see
also Benjamin West Janke, Revisiting Contra Non Valentem in Light of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 68 LA. L. REV. 497, 536 (2008) (collecting cases).
Louisiana courts have certainly entertained the idea of reviving perempted claims.
See, e.g., Acands, Inc., 687 So. 2d at 84; Chance, 635 So. 2d at 178; Succession
of Faget v. Faget, 938 So. 2d 1003, 1007 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006); Succession
of McKay, 921 So. 2d 1219, 1223 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006). Notably, some
Louisiana courts have skirted the issue of reviving perempted claims by asserting
that the time limit was neither prescriptive nor peremptive. Thus, the courts
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1466 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Louisiana courts follow the Chance approach and refuse to retroactively
revive a perempted claim in the absence of a “clear and unequivocal”
expression of legislative intent.240 Louisiana courts’ reluctance to use
jurisprudence to revive perempted claims finds support in the civil law
doctrine of causae finitae.241 
Causae finitae, or the principle of extinguished actions, prevents the
retroactive application of new legislation or judicial decisions from
affecting litigation that was previously terminated by prior final judgment
or compromise or that was barred by prescription.242 Extinguished claims
can “no longer be affected by a new law.”243 New law may not affect
extinguished claims, but new law may have an immediate effect on
litigation currently in progress, or causa pendentes.244 
Causae finitae is the default rule in the civil law tradition, applying
only in the absence of the legislature’s express intent to revive
extinguished causes of action.245 Thus, the legislature can expressly
avoided the difficult question of determining whether a new law could
retroactively revive a perempted claim. See, e.g., Estate of Dean v. K-Mart Corp.,
678 So. 2d 599, 601 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1996); Tran v. Avondale Shipyards,
Inc., 665 So. 2d 507, 510 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1995). For example, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeal subverted the Guillory test by finding that a former
workers’ compensation statute created a cause of action for death benefits and
defined its existence with reference to a specific time period in which the worker
must die to create that cause of action. Instead of framing the time limitation in
the former statute as a peremptive period, the court argued that the time period
merely required a “condition precedent to the accrual of the right of action,” that
is, the worker’s death. See Dean, 678 So. 2d at 601; Tran, 665 So. 2d at 510 
(emphasis omitted); see also supra note 205.
240. Janke, supra note 239, at 536–37; see also Chance, 635 So. 2d at 178.
241. See Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 1999).
242. See id. (citing ROUBIER, supra note 95, at 32). The concept of causae
finitae parallels the notion of res judicata. See JACQUES GHESTIN & GILES 
GOUBEAUX, 462 TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL: INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE 415 (3d ed.
1990). Res judicata, or “the thing adjudged,” is a doctrine barring re-litigation of
claims between the parties that have already progressed to a final judgment. See 
LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4231 (1991); see also id. (2019); Frank L. Maraist, Civil 
Procedure–Special Proceedings, in 1 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 4.3, 52– 
53 (2005).
243. See generally ROUBIER, supra note 95, at 32.
244. See generally id.
245. See id.; PATRICE LEVEL, 90 ESSAI SUR LES CONFLITS DE LOIS DANS LE
TEMPS 161 (1959) (“Retroactive legislation is excluded, in terms of its effect,
from causae finitae. To extend the application of the new law to anterior claims
that have been terminated by a judicial decision, there must be an express
disposition contained in the retroactivity clause.”).
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2020] COMMENT 1467
provide that new legislation applies retroactively to previously terminated
claims, and the doctrine of causae finitae excludes such expressly
retroactive legislation.246 By contrast, civil law doctrine provides that
courts cannot revive extinguished causes of action.247 Although few
Louisiana courts have considered the issue, Louisiana law likely posits a 
bar to the retroactive application of a new jurisprudential interpretation to
prescribed actions.248 By analogy to peremption, the same logic would 
apply—that is, courts may not unilaterally revive perempted claims.249 
Under the factual circumstances in the circuit split at issue, therefore,
it is impossible for Louisiana courts to retroactively revive a filiation claim
perempted by article 209.250 Even if a Louisiana court classified article 197
as procedural under article 6 in an attempt to apply article 197
retroactivity—an unlikely result in light of Chance—the doctrine of
causae finitae would prevent that court from reviving filiation claims
extinguished under article 209.251 Although Louisiana courts do not have
the power to revive claims perempted under article 209, the Louisiana
Legislature does.252 Nevertheless, the civil law doctrine of causae finitae
is only part of the analysis because Louisiana’s law of retroactivity must
also comport with American constitutional law principles.253 
4. Constitutional Due Process: The American Approach to 
Extinguished Claims 
The common law approach to the revival of extinguished claims is
similar to the civil law causae finitae approach.254 In general, American
constitutional law and civil law principles align: State legislatures may 
246. See generally PATRICE LEVEL, 19 ESSAI SUR LES CONFLITS DE LOIS DANS
LE TEMPS 33 (1959); LEVEL, supra note 245, at 161–62.
247. See GHESTIN & GOUBEAUX, supra note 242, at 415.
248. See Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 1999)
(observing that “although there is a dearth of jurisprudential discussion on the
subject, there would appear to be a similar bar to the retroactive application of a
new jurisprudential interpretation to actions that have been finally terminated by
judgments or compromises, or extinguished by prescription”).
249. Cf. Hulin, 178 F.3d at 323.
250. See id.
251. See generally id. (citing ROUBIER, supra note 95, at 32); see also
discussion supra Section I.C.2.
252. See generally ROUBIER, supra note 95, at 32.
253. See Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 688–89 n.74–75.
254. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); cf.
ROUBIER, supra note 95, at 32.
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1468 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
revive or extend causes of action circumscribed by prior law.255 In Chase
Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, the United States Supreme Court held that
a state legislature may repeal or extend a statute of limitations even after a
prior statute of limitations has run.256 A state legislature’s power to alter
statutes of limitations is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment as
long as the time lapse does not divest a party with title to real or personal
property.257 The Court also distinguished between laws that affect
substantive rights and laws that are remedial or procedural.258 Statutes of
limitations, the Court noted, “go to matters of remedy, not to destruction
of fundamental rights.”259 The Court further observed that statutes of
limitations have never been regarded as “fundamental rights” and merely
represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate.260 Unlike
substantive laws, statutes of limitations are “good only by legislative
grace.”261 
As a result, statutes of limitations are generally subject to a significant
degree of legislative control.262 Based on the reasoning that legislative 
amendments to statutes of limitations are remedial rather than substantive
in nature and therefore do not affect vested rights, American courts have
subsequently found that state legislatures can revive causes of action
extinguished under previously imposed time limitations.263 Like Louisiana 
courts, American common law courts similarly require express legislative
intent for the revival of such causes of action.264 
255. See Chase, 325 U.S. at 314; cf. ROUBIER, supra note 95, at 32.
256. Chase, 325 U.S. at 311.
257. Id.





263. See, e.g., id.; Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885); Murphree v.
Raybestos–Manhattan, 696 F.2d 459, 460 (6th Cir. 1982); see also Int’l Union of
Elec., Radio, and Mach. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. 229, 243–44 
(1976) (finding that Congress could constitutionally provide for retroactive
application of an extended time period, thereby reviving an action that was already
barred by a statute of limitations when filed). Of course, this cannot be the case if
the state legislature or constitution otherwise prohibits the retroactive application
of laws. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 95–96 n.1 (1982) (observing
that Texas courts would not retroactively apply a statutory amendment because 
the Texas Constitution prohibited retroactive application of laws, such that the
state legislature could not divest a defendant of her right to rely on a statute of
limitations as a defense by reviving or extending the bar of limitation).
264. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 18 (2019).
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The closest common law analog to a peremptive period is a statute of
repose.265 A statute of repose “limits the time within which an action may 
be brought and is not related to the accrual of any cause of action; the
injury need not have occurred, much less have been discovered.”266 The 
bar on causes of actions not brought within the specified time limit is
absolute, unlike a statute of limitations, for which the bar is conditional.267 
As opposed to statutes of limitations jurisprudence, common law
jurisprudence on statutes of repose is unsettled.268 By conceptualizing 
statutes of repose as “substantive” in nature, some common law courts find
that legislatures may not revive causes of action barred by statutes of
repose because doing so would violate due process principles by depriving
defendants of their vested property rights.269 Most courts, however, find
that statutes of repose do not create vested property rights and thus do not
implicate due process concerns.270 Legislatures can therefore retroactively
revive those extinguished claims.271 In these jurisdictions, the rules for
statutes of repose are fundamentally the same as those for statutes of
limitations.272 A third, but similar, line of common law jurisprudence
posits that even if a defendant has a vested property right in repose, that
right should yield to a legislature’s retroactive application of a law when
important state interests are at issue.273 
In general, the American common law approach to revivals of
extinguished causes of action falls in line with the civil law doctrine of
causae finitae, except that some common law jurisdictions do not allow
legislatures to revive causes of action barred by statutes of repose.274 
Whether a common law court will allow the retroactive revival of a claim
barred by a statute of repose hinges on whether the court considers the
change substantive or if the new law otherwise affects a vested right.275 
Although common law statutes of repose are not the same as Louisiana’s
peremptive periods, in both Louisiana and common law jurisprudence, if 
265. Kovach, supra note 190, at 661; Janke, supra note 239, at 536–37.
266. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 7 (2019).
267. Id. 






274. Cf. id.; Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945);
ROUBIER, supra note 95, at 32.
275. See 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 18.
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1470 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
a change in the law does not affect a party’s vested right, then the law may
apply retroactively.276 
As previously indicated, Louisiana courts have not directly addressed
whether the Louisiana Legislature may revive perempted claims.277 After 
comparing the jurisprudence and doctrine of both civil law and common
law jurisdictions, it seems likely that the Louisiana Legislature may revive
causes of action extinguished under a previously imposed time limit.278 
Based on the text of article 6, the influences of the civil law doctrine of
causae finitae on Louisiana law, and Louisiana’s jurisprudential
incorporation of the common law constitutional due process notions of
vested rights, the Louisiana Legislature should have the power to expressly
revive perempted claims.279 The revival of a perempted action, moreover,
remains constitutional as long as the legislative change does not impair
vested rights.280 Article 197, therefore, can only revive claims preempted
by article 209 if the Louisiana Legislature expresses its intention for the
new law to retroactively revive those claims.281 Both common and civil
law doctrine sanction the Louisiana Legislature’s power to retroactively
revive perempted filiation claims, as long as applying article 197
retrospectively does not affect any parties’ vested rights and the Louisiana
Legislature expressly provides for a retroactive application.282 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF LOUISIANA’S 
LAW OF RETROACTIVITY
After the 2005 revision of the Civil Code, Louisiana courts struggled
with whether to apply article 197’s peremptive period to revive filiation
claims that were previously perempted under article 209.283 All Louisiana
appellate courts formerly dealt with the retroactivity problem by finding
that the right to bring a filiation claim expired upon a child’s 19th birthday,
pursuant to article 209.284 These courts asserted that the Louisiana 
276. See id.; see discussion supra Section I.B.
277. See discussion supra Section I.C.
278. See generally ROUBIER, supra note 95, at 32; Chase, 325 U.S. 304.
279. See discussion supra Section I.B–C.
280. See Chase, 325 U.S. at 314.
281. See generally ROUBIER, supra note 95, at 32.
282. See generally Chase, 325 U.S. 304.
283. See, e.g., Succession of Pelt, 244 So. 3d 476, 480–82 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 2018); LA. CIV. CODE art. 197 (2018); LA. CIV. CODE art. 209(C) (2005).
284. See, e.g., Thomas v. Roberts, 106 So. 3d 557 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2012);
In re Succession of Bailey, 82 So. 3d 322 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2011); In re
Succession of Smith, 29 So. 3d 723 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2010); In re Succession
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Legislature did not expressly provide for a retroactive application of article
197 and that reviving extinguished filiation claims would deprive other
heirs of their vested right to plead the exception of peremption.285 More 
recently, the Second and Third Circuits overruled their previous decisions, 
creating the present circuit split.286 Both courts found that an unfiliated
child who turned 19 before 2005 could bring a filiation action within one
year of her father’s death.287 The circuit split demonstrates the inherent
problems with Louisiana’s retroactivity and peremption analyses and
further indicates that a judicially fashioned solution cannot resolve the
article 197 quandary in a fair, doctrinally sound manner.288 
A. Majority Approach: You’re Too Late, Kid!
The Louisiana Legislature’s 2005 revisions to the law of filiation
created problems for Louisiana courts almost immediately.289 The earliest
appellate court to contemplate the issue was the Third Circuit in 2006.290 
In Succession of McKay, the court first considered the legislature’s intent
as to the retroactive application of article 197 based on the language in
article 197’s enacting legislation.291 The enacting legislation provided that
the new law “shall be applicable to all claims existing or actions pending 
on its effective date and all claims arising or actions filed on and after its
effective date.”292 The Third Circuit relied on previous interpretations of
similar enacting legislation and concluded that the legislature did not
provide a “clear and unequivocal” intention for the new law to revive
of James, 994 So. 2d 120 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2008); Jeanmarie v. Butler, 942
So. 2d 578, 579 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2006); Succession of McKay, 921 So. 2d
1219 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006).
285. See, e.g., James, 994 So. 2d at 125–26. In the enacting legislation for
article 197, the Louisiana Legislature expressed that the new article “shall be
applicable to all claims existing or actions pending on its effective date and all
claims arising or actions filed on and after its effective date.” Act No. 192, 2005
La. Acts 1444, 1459.
286. See generally Pelt, 244 So. 3d 476; Succession of Younger, 206 So. 3d
1088 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2016).
287. See Pelt, 244 So. 3d at 486; see also Younger, 206 So. 3d 1088.
288. See discussion infra Section II.A–C.
289. See, e.g., Succession of Faget v. Faget, 938 So. 2d 1003 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 2006); McKay, 921 So. 2d 1219.
290. See generally McKay, 921 So. 2d 1219.
291. See id.
292. See id. at 1223; see also Act No. 192, 2005 La. Acts 1444, 1459.
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1472 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
perempted filiation claims.293 The court subsequently found that the
legislature clearly intended to ensure that article 197 applied to causes of
action that were not yet perempted or were in the process of litigation as
of the June 2005 effective date.294 Article 197 was therefore inapplicable
to the perempted article 209 claims.295 Shortly after the Third Circuit 
rendered the McKay decision, Louisiana’s other appellate courts
considered the same issue.296 
Within a few months, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal
granted writs in a succession case posing the same question.297 In
Succession of Faget v. Faget, the First Circuit followed the McKay
decision.298 The First Circuit similarly read the new article’s enacting 
legislation to find that the Louisiana Legislature “does not clearly and
unequivocally express an intent to have the act apply retroactively to
revive a right.”299 The court determined the unfiliated child missed her
opportunity to bring her filiation claim by her 19th birthday.300 In dicta,
the court observed that the Faget heirs possessed a vested right to plead
the exception of peremption, and the legislature did not express any intent
to deprive them of that vested property right.301 The court implied,
following Chance, that the vested nature of the right rendered article 197
substantive in nature.302 The court could not apply the new law 
retroactively to revive perempted filiation claims because the Louisiana
Legislature did not express any intention for article 197 to have a
retroactive application.303 Following the McKay and Faget decisions, the
remaining circuits followed suit, applying the same rationale to find that
293. See McKay, 921 So. 2d at 1223; see also Cameron Par. Sch. Bd. v.
Acands, Inc., 687 So. 2d 84 (La. 1997).
294. McKay, 921 So. 2d at 1223.
295. Id.
296. See In re Succession of Bailey, 82 So. 3d 322 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2011); 
In re Succession of Smith, 29 So. 3d 723, 726 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2010); In re
Succession of James, 994 So. 2d 120, 125–26 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2008); 
Jeanmarie v. Butler, 942 So. 2d 578, 579 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2006); Succession
of Faget v. Faget, 938 So. 2d 1003, 1007 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006).
297. See generally Faget, 938 So. 2d at 1007.
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2020] COMMENT 1473
other children’s claims were perempted and refusing to apply article
197.304 
The McKay and Faget approach, which is the majority approach in the
present circuit split, engenders several problems.305 First, the McKay and
Faget courts incorrectly assumed that for children to proceed with their
filiation claims, article 197 must apply retroactively.306 Neither court
considered the threshold issue of whether retroactive application of article
197 was appropriate at all, which should be the first step in a Louisiana
retroactivity analysis.307 Second, the McKay and Faget courts avoided
classifying article 197 as procedural or substantive and instead relied on
the supposedly “clear and unequivocal” legislative intent in article 197’s
enacting legislation.308 The McKay and Faget courts’ argument that the
legislature’s intent was “clear and unequivocal” is questionable because
other courts found that the exact same language did not clearly indicate
the Louisiana Legislature’s intent.309 For example, the Third Circuit and
the Louisiana Supreme Court found that enacting legislation identical to 
article 197’s enacting language did not clearly indicate the legislature’s
304. See, e.g., In re Succession of Bailey, 82 So. 3d 322 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
2011); In re Succession of Smith, 29 So. 3d 723, 726 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2010)
(following McKay and James to find that the right to bring a filiation action was
extinguished—that is, perempted); In re Succession of James, 994 So. 2d 120,
125–26 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2008) (following McKay and Faget, but noting that
the time period imposed by both articles 209 and 197 are peremptive periods);
Jeanmarie v. Butler, 942 So. 2d 578, 579 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2006) (following
McKay and holding that the child’s claims were extinguished—that is,
perempted—under former article 209).
305. See generally Faget, 938 So. 2d 1003; Succession of McKay, 921 So. 2d
1219 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006).
306. This reasoning is only partially correct. The retroactive application of
article 197 would only function to revive a claim perempted by article 209; article 
197 could then apply prospectively to all filiation claims arising after its 2005
effective date. See generally Trahan, Time, supra note 32.
307. See id. at 766; see also discussion supra Section I.B.
308. See Faget, 938 So. 2d at 1007; McKay, 921 So. 2d at 1222–23. Albeit in
dicta, the McKay court indicated that it would take the Chance plurality approach 
on the issue—that is, although the legislation would normally be classified as 
procedural, because it affected a substantive right to plead the exception of
peremption, the court classified the law as substantive and did not apply it
retroactively. McKay, 921 So. 2d at 1222–23; see also Chance v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 635 So. 2d 177, 178 (La. 1994).
309. See Faget, 938 So. 2d at 1007; McKay, 921 So. 2d at 1222–23.
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1474 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
intent.310 Therefore, the Faget and McKay courts should have proceeded
to the second step in an article 6 analysis and should have classified article
197 as procedural, substantive, or interpretative.311 
Third, both courts conflated peremptive and prescriptive periods as
well as the rules and the cases that govern them.312 For example, the courts
observed that article 209 imposed a peremptive period but proceeded to
cite cases concerning the retroactivity of prescriptive periods.313 The 
courts’ reliance on jurisprudence governing prescriptive periods is
incorrect because the doctrines of peremption and prescription are not the
same.314 Under the general peremption rules, once a claim is perempted, 
that claim dies.315 The courts should have clearly asserted that point
because the expiration of the former article’s peremptive period
extinguished the filiation claims; thus, retroactive application of article
197 to revive those extinguished claims was out of the question in the
absence of legislative expression.316 A court’s retroactive application of
article 197 to revive claims perempted under article 209 could not solve
the problem posed by article 209’s peremptive period because the doctrine
of causae finitae prevents courts from reviving extinguished claims.317 
Louisiana courts simply do not have the power to revive extinguished
claims.318 
More recently, the Second Circuit’s 2012 decision in Thomas v.
Roberts and the Third Circuit’s 2014 decision in Meaux v. Guidry
extended the Faget and McKay rationales.319 The Second and Third 
310. Succession of Pelt, 244 So. 3d 476, 482 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018) (citing
Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Kennedy, 914 So. 2d 533, 543 (La. 2005)).
311. See discussion supra Section I.B.
312. See, e.g., McKay, 921 So. 2d at 1222–23.
313. See, e.g., Faget, 938 So. 2d at 1007; see also Chance, 635 So. 2d 177.
314. See discussion supra Section I.C.
315. See Gelpi, supra note 201, at 259; Richardson, supra note 32, at 1188.
316. See Richardson, supra note 32, at 1212–13.
317. See generally id.; see also Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 323
(5th Cir. 1999).
318. See id.
319. See generally Meaux v. Guidry, 140 So. 3d 871, 874 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
2014); Thomas v. Roberts, 106 So. 3d 557 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2012). The
Second Circuit’s decision in Washington v. Magnolia Manor Nursing Home is
distinguishable from Meaux and Thomas. In Washington, the court considered
whether an unfiliated son could bring a wrongful death and survival action after
he turned 19 but within one year of his father’s death. Washington v. Magnolia
Manor Nursing Home and Rehab., 247 So. 3d 156, 159 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
2018). The Second Circuit concluded that the article 2315 exception, added to
article 209 in 1984, applied to the child’s claims. His filiation action, therefore,
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2020] COMMENT 1475
Circuits found that article 209 perempted all attempts to filiate, including
filiation claims brought outside of a succession context.320 In both cases, 
the unfiliated children brought their filiation claims prior to their fathers’
deaths.321 Following McKay and Faget, the Thomas and Meaux courts 
found that the children could not institute filiation actions in any context
because their claims were perempted when they turned 19.322 Even though 
the children’s fathers were not deceased in either case, the courts
prevented the children from instituting filiation actions and refused to 
apply article 197.323 The Thomas and Meaux courts declined to allow
children over age 19 an opportunity to filiate, even though article 197
abolished the time and age limitations on filiation actions outside of the
succession context.324 The courts thus implemented a harsh extension of
the McKay and Faget rationale.325 
The majority approach to article 197 is also flawed because it supports
a policy rationale that favors the timely disposition of property and the
stability of title in successions cases over the rights of children born out of
wedlock.326 For filiation actions outside of a succession context, however, 
the policy rationale for applying article 209’s short time limit is even more
inequitable.327 Continuing to apply pre-2005 law that perpetuates the
differentiation between children born out of wedlock and children born to
married parents on such thin policy justifications is not ideal.328 Louisiana
courts should be hesitant to enforce the “harsh result” of article 209
because modern policy does not support imposing a time period based
solely on a child’s age under the pretext that 19 years is enough time for a 
child to timely institute filiation proceedings.329 When the Louisiana 
Legislature replaced article 209 with article 197, it sought to promote
equity and policy considerations.330 The legislature’s 2005 removal and
was never time-barred by article 209(C). Id. at 161; see also LA. CIV. CODE art.
209(C) (2005).
320. See generally Meaux, 140 So. 3d at 874; Thomas, 106 So. 3d 557.
321. See Meaux, 140 So. 3d 871; Thomas, 106 So. 3d 557.
322. Meaux, 140 So. 3d at 873–74; Thomas, 106 So. 3d at 560.
323. Meaux, 140 So. 3d at 873–74; Thomas, 106 So. 3d at 560.
324. See Meaux, 140 So. 3d at 873–74; Thomas, 106 So. 3d at 560.
325. See generally Meaux, 140 So. 3d at 873–74; Thomas, 106 So. 3d at 560.
326. See generally LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 cmt. e (2018); Succession of
Grice, 462 So. 2d 131, 135–36 (La. 1985).
327. See generally LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 cmt. e (2018); Grice, 462 So.
2d at 135–36.
328. See generally LA CIV. CODE art 209 (2005).
329. See Succession of Pelt, 244 So. 3d 476, 484 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018);
see also Grice, 462 So. 2d at 135–36.
330. See Pelt, 244 So. 3d at 484.
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1476 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
replacement of article 209 undoubtedly promoted a more reasonable
opportunity for children born out of wedlock to pursue a filiation action.331 
The majority approach fails to adequately explain how enforcing a rigid 
time limitation based exclusively on a child’s age promotes the timely
disposition of property or the stability of land titles in situations where a
child seeks filiation for non-succession purposes.332 Nevertheless, 
appellants have presented creative arguments to the courts that subscribe
to the majority approach in an attempt to achieve more equitable results.333 
B. The Fifth Circuit Enters the Fray
In In re Succession of Bailey, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeal considered two novel arguments regarding article 209’s 
peremption rule.334 The appellants argued that because article 197
removed article 209’s age requirement and article 197 does not explicitly
provide for retroactive application, the Louisiana Legislature created a gap
in the law for filiation claims.335 According to the appellants, Louisiana
courts should fill this purported gap in legislation with principles of
equity.336 The appellants argued that the trial court erred “when it filled in 
the gap in legislation” created by articles 209 and 197 “with judicial
decisions instead of using the principles of equity.”337 In the alternative, 
the Bailey appellants argued that they should prevail on equitable estoppel
grounds because they relied to their detriment on the fact that the decedent
was their father.338 
331. See discussion supra Section I.A.3; see generally LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 197 cmt. e (2018); Grice, 462 So. 2d at 135–36.
332. See generally LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 cmt. e (2018); Grice, 462 So.
2d at 135–36.
333. See, e.g., In re Succession of Bailey, 82 So. 3d 322 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
2011).
334. See generally id.
335. Id. at 325.
336. Id. The appellants relied on Louisiana Civil Code article 4, which
provides: “When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from legislation
or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity. To decide equitably,
resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 4
(2018).
337. Bailey, 82 So. 3d at 325; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 4.
338. Bailey, 82 So. 3d at 326. Specifically, the appellants contended that their
purported father represented that he was their father through his conduct by
claiming they were his children on legal documents as well as providing food and
care for them; they justifiably relied on his representation that he was their father; 
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The Fifth Circuit did not find merit in either of the appellants’
arguments and instead followed the McKay and Faget approach.339 The 
court maintained that no gap existed between articles 209 and 197.340 
Article 209 perempted the appellants’ claims, which meant that the court
did not need to proceed according to equity.341 Also, the Fifth Circuit 
found that the equitable estoppel claim could not prevail against article 
209 because “the application of equitable estoppel in this matter is not
justified.”342 
The Bailey appellants’ equity argument is certainly a fresh perspective
on a complex issue.343 Their approach is nevertheless problematic because
the appellants assume that a temporal gap exists in the law between articles
209 and 197.344 Prospective application of article 197 immediately
followed the repeal of 209, preventing any gap.345 The appellants’
argument falls flat because, as the court indicated in dicta, positive law
should precede a resort to equity.346 Here, articles 209 and 197 prevent a 
gap in the law because there was no lapse in coverage once article 209 was
repealed and article 197 became effective; thus, equitable principles
should not be used to circumvent the existing legislation.347 
An equity-based approach also fails because it does not provide a path
around the peremption problem.348 Any attempted jurisprudential solution
must contend with the causae finitae issue, and Louisiana doctrine and
jurisprudence do not provide that courts may revive perempted claims.349 
As only the Louisiana Legislature may revive perempted claims, both the
Bailey case and the recent Second and Third Circuit cases demonstrate
and as a result, their position changed to their detriment because they were unable
to inherit. Id.
339. Id. at 325 (citing In re Succession of Smith, 29 So. 3d 723, 726 (La. Ct. 
App. 3d Cir. 2010)); see also In re Succession of James, 994 So. 2d 120, 125–26 
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2008).
340. Bailey, 82 So. 3d at 325.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 326 (asserting in dicta that equitable estoppel is a “doctrine of last
resort” and that equity should not prevail when it conflicts with positive law, here,
article 209).
343. See id. at 325; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 4 (2018).
344. See Richardson, supra note 32, at 1216–18.
345. See Bailey, 82 So. 3d at 325; LA. CIV. CODE art. 4; see also Richardson,
supra note 32, at 1216–18.
346. See Bailey, 82 So. 3d at 325; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 4.
347. But see Bailey, 82 So. 3d at 326.
348. See Richardson, supra note 32, at 1216–18.
349. See generally Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 
1999).
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1478 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Louisiana courts’ inability to overcome the doctrinal and jurisprudential
impediments surrounding this body of law.350 
C. Retroactive by Association Approach
In 2016, the Second Circuit’s decision in Succession of Younger
invented a “retroactive by association” approach to retroactivity.351 Based 
on the text of article 197, the Younger court concluded that the Louisiana 
Legislature intended for courts to read article 197 in conjunction with the 
Civil Code articles governing successions.352 To be precise, the Second 
Circuit read article 197 in pari materia353 with article 870(B), the 
succession article providing that succession rights are governed by the law 
in effect at the time of the decedent’s death.354 The court determined that
because the enacting legislation for article 870 provided for it to “apply 
both prospectively and retroactively,” article 197 should apply
retroactively as well.355 Reading article 197 with article 870(B) required 
the court to apply the law in effect at the time of the decedent’s death.356 
The father in Younger died in 2015, and the law in effect at that time was 
article 197.357 According to the court, the child’s filiation action was
therefore timely under article 197 because she filed her filiation action
within a year of her father’s death.358 
350. See discussion supra Section I.C.
351. See generally Succession of Younger, 206 So. 3d 1088 (La. Ct. App. 2d
Cir. 2016).
352. Article 197 provides that its peremptive period applies “for purposes of
succession only.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 197 (2018). Due to this succession reference,
the Younger court asserted that the Louisiana Legislature enacted article 197 “in
light of the laws governing successions.” Younger, 206 So. 3d at 1092; see also
LA. CIV. CODE art. 197.
353. The Louisiana Civil Code provides for the in pari materia principle of
statutory construction: “Laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in
reference to each other.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 13; Lamonica & Jones, supra note
87, § 7.7, at 149–51.
354. Younger, 206 So. 3d at 1092; LA. CIV. CODE art. 870(B); see also
discussion supra Section I.A.2.
355. Younger, 206 So. 3d at 1092; see also Act No. 560 § 3, 2001 La. Acts 
1169, 1170. The Younger court confounded the issue of whether article 197
should be applied retroactively or prospectively. See Younger, 206 So. 3d at 1092.
356. See Younger, 206 So. 3d at 1092; see also LA. CIV. CODE arts. 197,
870(B).
357. See Younger, 206 So. 3d at 1092; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 197.
358. Younger, 206 So. 3d at 1092; LA. CIV. CODE art. 197.
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2020] COMMENT 1479
In 2018, the Third Circuit followed Younger in Succession of Pelt.359 
Before reaching the same conclusion as Younger, the Third Circuit 
bolstered the retroactivity by association approach with intriguing dicta.360 
First, the court considered other cases in which the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that parallel enacting language to article 197’s enacting
legislation clearly indicated the legislature’s intent to apply new
legislation retroactively.361 Second, the court considered the policy
implications of continuing to enforce the “harsh result” of article 209,
arguing that modern policy does not justify imposing such a restrictive
time period based almost entirely upon an unfiliated child’s age.362 The
Louisiana Legislature replaced article 209 with article 197 to promote
equity and policy considerations.363 According to Pelt, the time limit that
former article 209 imposed on all filiation claims was a “harsh result not
justified by any policy consideration.”364 Applying article 197, by contrast,
promoted the general policy of treating all children equally under
Louisiana law.365 In light of the policy considerations, the court asserted 
that the majority approach disingenuously imposed article 209 on children
who brought filiation actions after article 197’s effective date.366 
Third, the Pelt court discussed the often-raised vested rights
argument.367 The court dismissed the arguments of prior courts that the 
decedent’s legal heirs acquired a vested right to plead the exception of
peremption when an unfiliated child turned 19.368 The court defined vested 
rights as the right “to enjoyment, present or prospective,” which “has
359. Succession of Pelt, 244 So. 3d 476, 485 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018)
(holding that article 197 should apply “retroactively” in pari materia with article
870(B)). Like the Younger court, the Pelt court confused the issue of whether
article 197 would apply retroactively or prospectively to the child’s filiation
claim. See id.
360. See generally id.
361. Id. at 482 (citing Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Kennedy, 914 So. 2d 533,
543 (La. 2005)).
362. See id. at 484.
363. See id.
364. Id.; see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 cmt. e (2018). The policy
behind article 209’s restrictive peremptive period was likely to facilitate the 
orderly and timely disposition of estates, as well as the stability of land titles. The 
Louisiana Legislature carried this policy motivation into article 197, indicated by
the retention of a peremptive period for succession purposes. See LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 197 cmt. e.
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1480 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
become the property of some particular person or persons as a present
interest.”369 A vested right must be “absolute, complete and unconditional,
[and] independent of a contingency.”370 The court stated that the alleged 
father acquired a vested right to plead the exception of peremption on his
unfiliated child’s 19th birthday.371 The heirs had no interest in the child’s 
filiation action or any interest in the succession until after their father’s
death.372 The court concluded that the heirs could not have a vested right
before the death of their father.373 As the heirs could not have asserted an 
exception of peremption at any time prior to their father’s death, the court
opined that the heirs clearly did not have a vested right under Louisiana
law.374 
The Pelt and Younger courts’ efforts to subvert the article 197
peremption problem are deeply flawed.375 Louisiana doctrine simply does
not support the Pelt court’s rationale.376 One glaring issue unique to the 
Pelt decision was the court’s assertion that the father’s vested right to
plead the exception of peremption was distinct from his heirs’ rights to
plead the exception of peremption.377 Louisiana doctrine, however, posits 
369. Id. at 485 (quoting with approval W.R.M. v. H.C.V., 951 So. 2d 172,
175–76 (La. 2007) (per curiam) (Johnson, J., concurring) (quoting Sawicki v. K/S




373. Id. (“A succession cannot exist before the death of the deceased, and,
therefore, a potential heir cannot have a right or vested claim before that time.”).
374. Id.
375. See generally id.; Succession of Younger, 206 So. 3d 1088, 1092 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 2016).
376. See Trahan, Filiation, supra note 40, at 444 n.89.
377. This dictum erroneously implied that the father’s right to plead the
exception of peremption was strictly personal. See Pelt, 244 So. 3d at 485. An
obligation is “strictly personal” when its performance can only be enforced by the
parties to a juridical act. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1766 (2018). For example, the
obligation to fulfill an engagement is strictly personal, and if a party to the
engagement contract dies before fulfilling the engagement, the right of action dies
with that party. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1766 cmt. c (2018). Conversely, an
obligation is “heritable” when a successor in a party’s right may enforce the right
of the obligor; thus, a heritable obligation is transferable between parties. See LA.
CIV. CODE art. 1765 (2018). In the civil law, obligations are presumptively
heritable. See id. French doctrine supports the notion that actions concerning a
person’s status, like filiation, are heritable under Louisiana law. Trahan, Filiation, 
supra note 40, at 444 n.89 (citing LAURENT, 3 PRINCIPLES DE DROIT CIVIL
FRANÇAIS 435, 549 (2d ed. 1876)).
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2020] COMMENT 1481
that the right to filiate is heritable.378 By analogy, the right to prevent a 
filiation action by pleading the exception of peremption would also be
heritable.379 When the father died, his heirs inherited his right to plead the
exception of peremption because his heirs inherited his legal estate, which
includes all of the property, rights, and obligations that their father left
behind after his death.380 Thus, the heirs’ and the father’s right to plead the
exception of peremption is actually the same right.381 
Aside from the heritability problem, the main issue with the Younger
and Pelt approach to retroactivity of laws is that the courts chart an
unprecedented route to achieve a “retroactive” result, a route not founded
in prior legislation, jurisprudence, or doctrine.382 Either due to confusion
or in an attempt to evade retroactivity rules, both the Pelt and Younger
courts argued for a retroactive application of article 197 when the
application the courts intended necessarily applied prospectively.383 As the 
fathers in both cases died after 2005, the effective law was article 197.384 
The real problem with the courts’ rationales is that both courts attempted
to revive perempted claims by contending that article 197 should be
interpreted to retroactively revive perempted filiation claims.385 
Louisiana’s doctrine of causae finitae, however, prevents courts from
reviving such perempted claims.386 In essence, no matter how the Second 
and Third Circuits sought to contort around Louisiana’s doctrines of
retroactivity and peremption, they should have reached the same inevitable
conclusion: Courts do not have the power to revive perempted claims.387 
378. See Trahan, Filiation, supra note 40, at 444 n.89.
379. See id.
380. See id.; LA. CIV. CODE art. 872 (“The estate of a deceased means the 
property, rights, and obligations that a person leaves after his death . . . . The estate
includes not only the rights and obligations of the deceased as they exist at the
time of death, but all that has accrued thereto since death . . . .”).
381. See Trahan, Filiation, supra note 40, at 444 n.89.
382. Prior to Pelt and Younger, Louisiana courts entertained the idea of
reviving prescribed or perempted causes of actions, but they declined to do so in
the absence of clear legislative intent. Janke, supra note 239, at 536 (collecting
cases, including Chance, Faget, and McKay). Previously, no Louisiana court had
ever explicitly interpreted a legislative act as reviving a prescribed or perempted
claim. See id.
383. See Succession of Pelt, 244 So. 3d 476, 485 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018);
Succession of Younger, 206 So. 3d 1088, 1092 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2016).
384. See generally Pelt, 244 So. 3d 476; Younger, 206 So. 3d 1088.
385. See Pelt, 244 So. 3d at 485; Younger, 206 So. 3d at 1092; see also
Richardson, supra note 32, at 1216–18.
386. See, e.g., Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 1999).
387. See discussion supra Section I.B–C.
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1482 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
The courts’ reasoning derogates from other accepted Louisiana
doctrines as well.388 The Civil Code articles on filiation and succession are
not “on the same subject matter,” contrary to the courts’ assumptions.389 
The enacting legislation for article 870(B), a succession article, should
therefore not apply to the unrelated filiation article 197.390 In addition,
applying article 197 only to revive filiation claims for succession purposes
does not resolve the issue of whether article 197 applies to other filiation
claims.391 The Pelt and Younger decisions are distinguishable from cases
that held that article 209 perempted other filiation claims, and, therefore,
the retroactive by association approach is not a unified solution to the
article 197 problem.392 
Beyond their peculiar and flawed approaches to retroactivity, Younger
and Pelt are a step toward achieving a just result that allows children born
out of wedlock to inherit from their fathers even though they failed to bring 
filiation actions before their 19th birthdays.393 Louisiana’s courts have
tried and failed to properly apply retroactivity and peremption rules to
articles 197 and 209.394 A jurisprudential solution simply does not work.395 
Louisiana children born out of wedlock will only have an fair chance at
inheritance if the Louisiana Legislature acts to reconcile article 197 with
the existing doctrines of peremption and retroactivity.396 
III. TIME TO AMEND ARTICLE 197
Articles 197 and 209 pose a unique problem in Louisiana law because 
the articles exemplify all that is wrong with Louisiana’s law of peremption
and retroactivity.397 The existing deficiencies in the law make achieving a
just result difficult.398 For certain children to have a right to filiate, they
must overcome former article 209; furthermore, Louisiana’s laws of 
388. See discussion supra Section I.A.2.
389. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 13 (2018); see also Lamonica & Jones, supra note
87, § 7.7, at 149–51.
390. See generally Act No. 560 § 3, 2001 La. Acts 1169, 1170; LA. CIV. CODE
arts. 197, 870(B) (2018).
391. See generally Meaux v. Guidry, 140 So. 3d 871, 873–74 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
Cir. 2014); Thomas v. Roberts, 106 So. 3d 557, 560 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2012).
392. See generally Meaux, 140 So. 3d at 873–74; Thomas, 106 So. 3d at 560.
393. See generally Succession of Pelt, 244 So. 3d 476, 485 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 2018); In re Succession of Bailey, 82 So. 3d 322 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2011).
394. See generally discussion supra Part II.
395. See generally discussion supra Part II.
396. See discussion infra Part III.
397. See generally Richardson, supra note 32; Trahan, Time, supra note 32.
398. See Richardson, supra note 32, at 1213 n.219.
346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd  495 10/12/20  7:08 AM





    
      
        
    
 
   
     
         
  
     
   
   
  




        
   
        
      
        
2020] COMMENT 1483
peremption and retroactivity are structured in a way that is formidable for 
children born out of wedlock to overcome.399  An equitable and 
theoretically sound result is possible, but only if the Louisiana Legislature 
steps in to correct the wrongs wrought by an extremely problematic body 
of law.400  Only the legislature can revive claims perempted under article 
209.401  An amendment to article 197 is thus necessary to make both the 
law and the legislature’s intent clear.402  
A. Proposal to Amend Article 197 
In the absence of a compelling and legally sound jurisprudential 
solution, the Louisiana Legislature should amend article 197 to revive 
claims perempted by article 209.403  The article proposed in this Comment 
will help to ameliorate intertemporal conflicts of law in future revisions to 
the Code.404  The most economical way for the Louisiana Legislature to 
amend article 197 is to incorporate language similar to that found in a 
transitional statute.405  In other words, the legislature must explicitly 
provide that article 197 applies—after a specific point in time—to all 
filiation claims, with the exception of the cases already resolved by a final 
judgment.406  The amended article is thus limited to filiated claims not yet 
399. See id.
400. See discussion infra Part III.
401. See generally GHESTIN & GOUBEAUX, supra note 242, at 415; ROUBIER, 
supra note 95, at 32 (noting that causae finitae is the default rule in the civil law
tradition, applying only in the absence of the legislature’s express intent to revive
extinguished causes of action); see also discussion supra Section I.C.3–4.
402. See generally ROUBIER, supra note 95, at 32.
403. See generally GHESTIN & GOUBEAUX, supra note 242, at 415; ROUBIER, 
supra note 95, at 32.
404. See generally Richardson, supra note 32.
405. The Louisiana Legislature has previously enacted transitional statutes to
ease the adjustment process following changes in succession law. See Kelly
Grieshaber Dunn, Forced Heirship Lives: The Effects of Louisiana Revised
Statute Title 9, Section 2501, 46 LOY. L. REV. 619, 620 (2000); see also
Succession of Boyter, 756 So. 2d 1122, 1123 (La. 2000). Following major
changes to Louisiana’s forced heirship laws, the legislature enacted transitional
provisions to address the issue of which law applied at a given time. See, e.g., LA.
REV. STAT. § 9:2501 (1997); see also Lorio, supra note 6, § 10.15, at 359. For
example, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2501 provided rules for interpreting
testaments written before the change in Louisiana’s forced heirship laws. See 
JOSEPH A. PROKOP, JR., 1 LOUISIANA SUCCESSIONS § 16.01[4] (3d ed. 2018).
406. Such a statutory form resembles a transitional statute. See, e.g., LA. REV.
STAT. § 9:2501 (1997); see also Lorio, supra note 6, § 10.15, at 359. The doctrine
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1484 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
litigated.407 Therefore, the Louisiana Legislature should amend article 197
to add the italicized paragraph:
A child may institute an action to prove paternity even though he 
is presumed to be the child of another man. If the action is
instituted after the death of the alleged father, a child shall prove
paternity by clear and convincing evidence. 
For the purposes of succession only, this action is subject to a
peremptive period of one year. This peremptive period
commences to run from the day of the death of the alleged father.
The provisions of this Article became effective on June 25, 2005,
and shall apply to all filiation actions instituted or pending after
that date, including those actions perempted under former Civil
Code Article 209. 
With this amendment, the Louisiana Legislature would clarify that the
article retroactively revives claims perempted under 209 and that the new
law governs all filiation claims arising after article 197 became effective
in June 2005.408 This legislative solution also avoids the unjust results
of res judicata, embodied in Louisiana Revised Statutes § 13:4231, provides that a
valid and final judgment is generally conclusive between the same parties. See LA.
REV. STAT. § 13:4231 (1991); see also Maraist, supra note 242, § 4.3, at 52–53. The
cases discussed in this Comment, therefore, would be subject to res judicata
principles, and the proposed legislative amendment would not act to revive those
parties’ claims. See Lamonica & Jones, supra note 87, § 6.4, at 127–28.
407. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4231 (1991); Maraist, supra note 242,
§ 4.3, at 52–53. Opening previously disposed cases would create additional
problems beyond the scope of this Comment. If the amendment expressly
provided for the reopening of closed cases, Louisiana’s courts would face the
practical problem of contending with those cases a second time. Beyond the
practical concerns, opening these cases would contravene the doctrine of res 
judicata. See supra note 406; see also Maraist, supra note 242, § 4.3, at 52–53. 
Generally, the doctrine serves the policy goals of discouraging unnecessary
litigation and protecting the parties’ reliance on the resolved ruling. Hall, supra
note 98, at 604. For example, if Karla’s case was reopened today, after the
succession proceedings closed more than 10 years ago, the court would have to
determine how to reallocate Louis’s estate, potentially taking property from Louis
Jr. Another practical problem is that Louis Jr. might have disposed of his portion
of the estate, leaving no property for Karla to inherit. Such an application would
have additional due process ramifications. See generally discussion supra Section
I.B–C.
408. See generally discussion supra Section I.C.
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2020] COMMENT 1485
Louisiana courts reached.409 The amended article provides a fair
opportunity for children born out of wedlock to timely institute a filiation
action within one year of their fathers’ deaths.410 Instead, children like 
Karla would have a reasonable prospect of inheriting from their fathers,
rather than inheriting nothing pursuant to a strict, antiquated regime.411 
Moreover, the amended article equally applies to situations in which
article 209 perempted filiation claims outside of the succession context, 
unlike the recent retroactive by association court decisions.412 Amended
article 197, therefore, successfully applies a just rule to all children born 
to unmarried parents who seek to inherit from their fathers.413 
As the number of children born out of wedlock makes up such a 
substantial portion of Louisiana’s population, and especially as their
fathers age, these cases will continue to vex Louisiana’s courts.414 Courts
will continue to struggle with the question posed by articles 197 and 209,
leaving the courts to either choose to follow arcane policy justifications
that promote the efficient and stable disposition of property, or otherwise
craft theoretically unsound jurisprudence that would achieve a fair result
for children born out of wedlock.415 A legislative solution is not only
necessary to resolve this issue, but also imperative to prevent further
muddling of Louisiana’s legal doctrine and to curb discord among
Louisiana’s appellate courts.416 The Louisiana Legislature must recognize
that it is finally time to preference children over property and that
removing the last traces of a peremptive period based on an arbitrary 
birthdate will achieve the justice long sought but often denied to so many 
of Louisiana’s children.417 
409. Cf. Succession of Pelt, 244 So. 3d 476 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018); In re
Succession of Bailey, 82 So. 3d 322 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2011).
410. Cf. In re Succession of Smith, 29 So. 3d 723 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2010);
In re Succession of James, 994 So. 2d 120 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2008); In re
Succession of Faget, 938 So. 2d 1003 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006); In re
Succession of McKay, 921 So. 2d 1219 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006).
411. See generally In re Succession of Hebert, 153 So. 3d 1101 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 2014).
412. Cf. Pelt, 244 So. 3d 476; Succession of Younger, 206 So. 3d 1088 (La.
Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2016).
413. Cf. Pelt, 244 So. 3d 476; Younger, 206 So. 3d 1088.
414. See discussion supra Part II.
415. See discussion supra Part II.
416. See discussion supra Parts I–II.
417. See discussion supra Parts I–II.
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1486 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
B. Ameliorating Retroactivity Concerns
The proposed change to the law presents potential retroactivity issues;
however, due to the nature of filiation, the amended article evades such
doctrinal problems.418 Under Louisiana’s cumbersome law of
retroactivity, vested rights are always at the heart of the analysis.419 The 
threshold issue is whether a retroactive application will occur at all.420 
Here, the question is whether article 197 impairs a father and his heirs’
vested right to oppose an unfiliated child bringing a filiation action.421 
Amending article 197 will not sour a Louisiana vested rights analysis
because the amendment does not affect vested rights.422 
The amended article 197 does not divest a father of any vested right.423 
Again, vested rights are patrimonial rights, susceptible of monetary
evaluation, and are also present rights.424 Filiation, however, is
predominately an extra-patrimonial right because it concerns the legal
relationship between a child and parent, and, moreover, filiation is also an 
expectant right.425 The civilian tradition does not consider personal rights 
or family rights as patrimonial.426 Although the civil effects of filiation— 
including the rights to support, to inherit, and to sue for wrongful death— 
are patrimonial in nature, filiation itself is principally an extra-patrimonial
right and, thus, not a vested right.427 Albeit, the parent–child relationship
includes some aspects that may be susceptible of pecuniary value, such as
the right to child support, the connection between the extra-patrimonial
filiation and its patrimonial civil effects is too attenuated.428 
418. See generally Trahan, Time, supra note 32.
419. See generally id.
420. See id. at 687.
421. Cf. W.R.M. v. H.C.V., 951 So. 2d 172, 177–78 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
(Johnson, J., concurring).
422. See discussion supra Section I.B.
423. See generally Trahan, Time, supra note 32, at 690; see also LITVINOFF &
TÊTE, supra note 110, at 140.
424. See discussion supra Section I.B; see also Trahan, Time, supra note 32,
at 690; LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 110, at 140.
425. See discussion supra Section I.B; see also Trahan, Filiation, supra note 
40, at 388 n.1 (citing CORNU, supra note 40, at 313).
426. See LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 110, at 140.
427. See generally LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 cmt. a (2018); see also
LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 110, at 140.
428. See generally LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 110, at 140; cf. W.R.M. v. 
H.C.V., 951 So. 2d 172, 177–78 (La. 2007) (per curiam) (Johnson, J., concurring).
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Moreover, the civilian concept of patrimony is consistent with the
American common law notion of vested property rights.429 Constitutional
due process considerations involve only the divestiture of property
rights—that is, the loss of title to real or personal property.430 The right to
filiate is also not absolute or independent of contingency as required under
a vested rights analysis because filiation is not a present right.431 Buying
into the Louisiana vested rights analysis necessitates the conclusion that a
father cannot have a vested right to prevent a child from establishing an
extra-patrimonial relationship with him.432 
Recall that the vested rights inquiry appears at three points in the
Louisiana retroactivity analysis. Regardless of where the proposed article
enters the retroactivity analysis, the article will never affect vested rights
because filiation is extra-patrimonial in nature.433 First, the amended 
article poses no retroactive application because article 197, as amended,
does not impact vested rights.434 Because the proposed article 197 does not
impair a vested right, it does not apply retroactively, passing the threshold
inquiry.435 Second, even if the proposed article called for a retroactive
application, the legislative intent that the article should revive perempted
claims is express.436 Under article 6, therefore, classification is
unnecessary.437 The third stage in the analysis is the constitutional due
process issue.438 Due process is not violated unless the article
unconstitutionally divests a property right.439 Again, the proposed statute
does not disturb vested property rights; therefore, it cannot be an
unconstitutional divestment of the father or his heirs’ constitutional
rights.440 
429. See discussion supra Section I.C.4.
430. See generally Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 311 (1945);
see discussion supra Section I.C.4.
431. See discussion supra Section I.B; see also Trahan, Time, supra note 32,
at 690; cf. W.R.M., 951 So. 2d at 177–78 (Johnson, J., concurring) (noting that a
father does not have a vested right to establish his legal relationship to his alleged
child in an avowal action because the right of avowal is not absolute).
432. Cf. W.R.M., 951 So. 2d at 177–78 (Johnson, J., concurring).
433. See generally LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 110, at 140.
434. See discussion supra Section I.B.
435. See discussion supra Section I.B.
436. See discussion supra Section I.B.
437. See discussion supra Section I.B.
438. See Lamonica & Jones, supra note 87, § 6.4, at 116.
439. See Hall, supra note 98, at 617.
440. Cf. W.R.M. v. H.C.V., 951 So. 2d 172, 177–78 (La. 2007) (per curiam)
(Johnson, J., concurring).
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1488 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
In short, because the right to filiate is an extra-patrimonial, expectant
right, it never implicates a constitutional concern and does not affect
vested rights at any stage in a Louisiana retroactivity analysis.441 Beyond 
the retroactivity concerns, the amended article 197, in reviving
extinguished filiation claims, does not violate the civilian principle of
causae finitae.
C. Causae Finitae Is Not a Barrier
The proposed amendment also avoids the general causae finitae rule
that new legislation cannot revive extinguished claims.442 Civilian scholars 
recognize that legislatures are empowered to change the default rule by 
expressly providing for the revival of extinguished claims.443 Louisiana
law differs from modern civilian approaches to causae finitae because
Louisiana’s notion of causae finitae is melded with constitutional due
process concerns about impairing vested rights, which places Louisiana
law in line with American jurisprudence on the issue.444 American
jurisprudence, like the civilian notions of causae finitae, does not run
counter to the proposed article because the change to the law does not
impair a vested property right.445 The United States Supreme Court
recognizes the power of state legislatures to revive extinguished claims, 
leading to the same result, and other common law courts permit
legislatures to retroactively revive claims extinguished by a statute of
repose or limitations as long as parties’ vested property rights are not
impaired.446 Under civilian and common law principles, the proposed
article is an appropriate exercise of legislative power.447 Amending article 
197 is the only way that Louisiana can properly resolve the peremption
problem that article 209 poses in a theoretically sound manner.448 
441. See Hall, supra note 98, at 617 (citing Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus.,
783 So. 2d 1251, 1259 (La. 2001)).
442. See, e.g., Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 1999).
443. See generally ROUBIER, supra note 95, at 32.
444. See, e.g., Hulin, 178 F.3d at 323.
445. See, e.g., Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945); see also
discussion supra Section I.C.4.
446. See generally Chase, 325 U.S. 304; Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620
(1885); Int’l Union of Elec., Radio, and Mach. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc.,
429 U.S. 229, 243–44 (1976); see also discussion supra Section I.C.4.
447. See discussion supra Section I.C.3–4.
448. See discussion supra Section I.B–C.
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CONCLUSION: AT THE CROSSROADS OF RETROACTIVITY AND 
PEREMPTION
Amending article 197 will allow children like Karla an equal
opportunity to inherit from their fathers.449 In a state where most children
are born out of wedlock, Louisiana needs a solution that will allow every
child a fair chance to inherit, regardless of her parents’ marital status at the
time of her birth.450 Only a legislative solution can resolve the disparities 
in Louisiana law in a doctrinally consistent manner.451 Leaving
Louisiana’s courts to resolve the problem will either accomplish an unjust
result for children born out of wedlock or effect a theoretically unsound
answer to an already complex legal problem.452 Without a legislative
amendment to article 197, the shaky foundation of retroactivity and 
peremption jurisprudence will continue to lead courts and attorneys
astray.453 Articles 197 and 209 should be cautionary tales to Louisiana’s 
legislators, judges, and scholars.454 Legislation that fails to consider the 
complexities of Louisiana’s retroactivity and peremption laws will 
continue to produce muddled jurisprudence, leaving only legislative action
to clarify the state of the law and resolve the inequities.455 
449. See discussion supra Section III.A; see generally In re Succession of
Hebert, 153 So. 3d 1101 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2014).
450. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 5.
451. See discussion supra Part III.
452. See discussion supra Section II.A–C.
453. See discussion supra Section I.B–C.
454. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 197 (2018); LA. CIV. CODE art. 209(C)
(2005).
455. See discussion supra Part III.
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